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Long a hotbed of discontent over federal public land management, Utah rekindled the
smoldering “sagebrush rebellion” in 2012 when it passed the Transfer of Public Lands Act (TPLA),1
demanding that the federal government turn millions of acres of public land2 over to the state.
Backed by a multi-million-dollar litigation budget, Utah’s efforts became a model for legislation that
sprang up across much of the West, and transfer theories were adopted as part of the Republican
National Committee Platform. A growing minority are also seizing on Utah’s legal theories to justify
wresting public lands from the federal government, too often in violent ways.
While unlikely to succeed in the courts, the transfer movement taps into a long history of
Western antagonism towards what some characterize as an overbearing federal absentee landlord.
This broad discontent, when combined with the threat of litigation, could lead to federal legislation
devolving the public domain to the states — and that could forever reshape our nation.
Part I summarizes the TPLA and the movement that the Act has spawned. Part II puts
current demands into historical context, summarizing the acquisition and disposal of the public
domain, federal authority over the public domain, and evolution of public land management policies.
Part III explains and critiques the legal and policy arguments favoring compulsory public land
disposal. Part IV summarizes the policy arguments behind, and the unintended consequences that
would flow from, a public land transfer. Part V proceeds from the premise that it is not enough to
simply critique the transfer movement by identifying the frustrations driving transfer efforts and
* John C. Ruple is an Associate Professor of Law (Research), and Wallace Stegner Center Fellow at the
University of Utah’s S.J. Quinney College of Law. This paper was made possible by the generous support
provided by the AHE/CI Trust and the ESSR Endowment Fund. The author would also like to thank
Professors Myrl Duncan, Robert Fischman, Hillary Hoffman, and Robert Keiter for their comments on
drafts of this article.
1

H.B. 148, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah) (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-6-101 through 104 (2014)).

2

As used herein, “public domain” refers to lands acquired by the United States from other sovereigns,

including Indian tribes, that remain federally owned. It is used interchangeably with the term “public lands.”
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offering constructive alternatives to transfer that address the underlying frustrations.
I.

Sagebrush Rebellion Revisited — The Public Lands Transfer Movement
Millions of acres of highly-coveted lands and minerals remain in federal ownership.

Dissatisfied with management that does not reflect the wishes of many in the state legislature, Utah,
in 2012, enacted legislation demanding title to millions of acres of federally managed lands. Enticed
by the prospect of quick riches, legislators across the West took up the issue. Interest from other
states was understandable because of common frustrations and shared histories. As federal
legislation authorizing statehood is generally consistent state-to-state, Utah’s arguments, if
successful, would likely apply West-wide, and permanently remake the West.
Transfer demands reflect frustrations that are as old as the nation itself and that re-emerge
every generation or so.3 Much has been written about the sagebrush rebellion;4 this article
intersperses bits and pieces of that history throughout to illuminate the narrative of today.
A.

Utah’s Transfer of Public Lands Act

Signed into law on March 23, 2012, the TPLA demands that by December 31, 2014, the

3

See e.g., Richard M. Mollison & Richard W. Eddy, Jr., The Sagebrush Rebellion: A Simplistic Response to the

Complex Problem of Federal Land Management, 19 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 100, n. 14 (1982) (cataloguing demands
to cede federal lands to the states from Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, and Missouri). See also, John D.
Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics, and Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317 (1980).
4

For a thorough discussion of the sagebrush rebellion, see, Robert L. Fischman & Jeremiah I. Williamson, The

Story of Kleppe v. New Mexico: The Sagebrush Rebellion as Un-Cooperative Federalism, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 123 (2011);
George Cameron Coggins, ‘Devolution’ in Federal Land Law: Abdication by any Other Name. . . , 14 HASTINGS
WEST-NORTHWEST J. OF ENVTL. L. & POLICY 485 (2008); Robert L. Glicksman, Fear and Loathing on the
Federal Lands, 45 U. KANSAS L. REV. 647 (1997); Scott Reed, The County Supremacy Movement: Mendacious Myth
Making, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 525 (1994); Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics, and Federal Lands,
supra note 3; Paul W. Gates, The Intermountain West Against Itself, 27 J. OF THE SOUTHWEST 205 (1985); and
Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective of the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL.
L. 847 (1982).
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United States transfer title to public lands within Utah to the state.5 Under the TPLA, “public lands”
include all federal lands except national parks, national monuments (other than the Grand StaircaseEscalante National Monument, which would be conveyed to the state), congressionally-designated
Wilderness Areas, Department of Defense areas, and tribal lands.6 The lands at issue are
administered primarily by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the United States Forest
Service (USFS), and also include the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area that is administered by
the National Park Service. Together, these lands cover approximately 31.2 million acres of Utah,7 or
an area roughly the size of the entire state of Mississippi.8
If public lands are transferred into state ownership, Utah may, under the TPLA, either retain
or sell the land.9 If Utah sells the land, the state would retain five-percent of net sale proceeds and
pay ninety-five-percent of the proceeds to the federal government. Utah’s share of sale proceeds
would be used to support public education.10 Utah may also retain the newly acquired lands, and
statements by legislators signal this intent,11 though fiscal realities may make that difficult.

5

UTAH CODE ANN. § 63L-6-103(1) (2014).

6

UTAH CODE ANN. § 63L-6-102(3) (2014).

7

UNIV. OF UTAH, UTAH STATE UNIV. &WEBER STATE UNIV., AN ANALYSIS OF A TRANSFER OF FEDERAL

LANDS TO THE STATE OF UTAH xxv (2014) (hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS), available at
http://publiclands.utah.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/1.%20Land%20Transfer%20Analysis%20Final%20Report.pdf.
8

Mississippi has a total area (land and water) of 48,432 square-miles, or 31 million acres. U.S. CENSUS

BUREAU, DEP’T OF COM., 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Table 358 at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/.
9

UTAH CODE ANN. § 63L-6-103(2) (2014).

10

UTAH CODE ANN. § 63L-6-103(3) (2014).

11

See e.g., Amy Joi O’Donoghue, House GOP Reiterates Stance on Public Lands, DESERET NEWS (March 6, 2015)

2015 WLNR 6794754 (quoting Rep. Stratton as saying that “it makes little sense to ‘sell off’ those lands.”);
Brian Maffly, Officials Say Economic Outlook Good for Public Land Transfer, but Keep Study Under Wraps, SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE (Nov. 19, 2014) (quoting Rep. Stratton that “Over my dead body do we transfer these public lands
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Exactly how Utah would manage acquired public lands, however, remains unclear. During
the 2014 legislative session Utah took steps towards clarifying management of the targeted lands by
enacting the Utah Wilderness Act.12 Utah, however, has yet to propose protecting any land under
this act. Furthermore, the Act contains exemptions to resource protections that could make
designations illusory.13 Allusions to wilderness protection aside, comments by key state officials
reveal a clear goal of increasing commodity production.14
The following year, the legislature enacted the Utah Public Land Management Act
(UPLMA),15 setting forth general management direction for the targeted lands. While modeled after
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)16 and touting multiple-use, sustained-yield
management, the UPLMA deletes key directions from FLPMA’s definition of “multiple use.” While
FLPMA directs the BLM to consider the “relative values of the resources and not necessarily [ ] the
combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit output,”17 no
such direction is contained in the UPLMA. Rather, the UPLMA directs the state to manage each

to the private sector. We will remain a public lands state.”) at: http://www.sltrib.com/news/1847306155/state-public-lands-utah-transfer-federal?.
12

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-7-1-1 through -109 (2014).

13

See e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 63L-7-106(12) (2014) (“The governor may, within protected wilderness areas,

authorize: . . . (b) the establishment and maintenance of reservoirs, water-conservation works, power projects,
transmission lines, and other facilities needed in developing water resources, including road construction and
essential maintenance.”).
14

According to Kathleen Clarke, Director of Utah’s Public Land Policy Coordination Office, there is the

“potential for variation in management scenario[s] that would invite significantly more revenue” if federal
public lands are transferred to the state. Trib Talk: Transferring federal lands to Utah, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE May
22, 2014 available at http://publiclands.utah.gov/kathleen-clarke-interviewed-for-trib-talk/.
15

H.B. 276, 2016 Gen. Sess. (Utah) (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-8-101—602, and 79-6-101—105).

16

43 U.S.C. §§ 1701—1784 (2012).

17

43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2012).
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parcel of land to promote “principal or major uses of the land.”18 The UPLMA also omits the
requirement to “take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the
lands,” which is contained in FLPMA.19
B.

Why the Transfer of Public Lands Act Matters

While the TPLA’s deadline for a public land handover passed without federal acquiescence
and Utah has not yet sued to force a transfer, Utah has spent millions preparing for such a fight,
other states are following Utah’s lead, and federal bills to affect transfer to states are emerging.20
Transfer rhetoric is also inspiring fringe groups to take up arms against the federal government.21
1.

The Proliferation of Bad Ideas

Inspired by the prospect of local control, increased commodity production, and the promise
of a revenue windfall that many assume a state takeover would bring, ten of the eleven contiguous
Western states had, by late 2015, entertained some form of transfer legislation. Idaho joined Utah in
calling for a takeover of federal public lands.22 Nevada23 and Wyoming24 enacted legislation calling
for transfer option studies. Nevada then enacted a joint resolution urging Congress to transfer
public lands to the state.25 In Montana, the legislature passed a joint resolution directing the

18

H.B. 276, 2016 Gen. Sess. (Utah) (to be codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 63L-8-103).

19

43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012).

20

See e.g., H.R. 1484, 114th Cong. (2015) (to convey no less than 7.2 million acres of public land to Nevada),

and H.R. 3650, 114th Cong. (2015) (to transfer National Forest System lands to states).
21

See e.g., Criminal Indictment, U.S. v. Bundy, No. 2:16-CR-46 (D. Nev. Feb. 17, 2016), and Criminal

Complaint, U.S. v. Bundy et al., No. 3:16-mj-004-1 –8 (D. Or. Jan. 16, 2016).
22

H.R. Con. Res. 22, 62nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2013) (demanding the federal government to

“imminently transfer title to all of the public lands within Idaho’s borders directly to the State of Idaho.”).
23

A.B. 227, 77th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2013) (creating a commission to study the public lands takeover).

24

H.R. 228, 62nd Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013) (creating a commission to study the takeover of federal public

lands).
25

S.J.R. 1, 78th Leg (Nevada 2015).
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Legislative Council to investigate “ownership and jurisdictional responsibilities” pertaining to the
public lands.26 The Arizona legislature passed a bill demanding that the United States extinguish title
to all public lands in Arizona and transfer them to the state, only to see the bill vetoed by the
Governor.27 Unable to override the Governor’s veto, transfer movement supporters then tried to
amend the Arizona Constitution to assert Arizona’s claim of title to federal public lands. While the
ballot measure was defeated soundly,28 the Arizona legislature refused to give in, eventually enacting
a bill to “to examine processes to transfer, manage and dispose of federal lands within this state.”29
The Colorado Legislature defeated at least one joint resolution and three transfer bills.30 The
New Mexico Legislature fought off at least nine similar efforts.31 Oregon thwarted four transfer
bills,32 and Washington blocked three transfer bills.33 Of the eleven contiguous Western states, only
California has not taken up the fight.

26

S.J.R. 15, 63rd Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2013).

27

S.B. 1332, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013); Governor Jan K. Brewer, Veto Statement for S.B. 1332

(May 14, 2013).
28

Arizona Proposition 120 (2012). Arizona Secretary of State, State of Arizona Official Canvas, 2012 General

Election, November 7, 2012 available at
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2012/general/electioninformation.htm.
29

H.B. 2658, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2015).

30

S.J.R. 13-031, 69th Gen. Sess. (Colo. 2013), and S.B. 13-142, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013); S.B. 15-039, 70th

Gen. Sess. (Colo. 2015), and S.B. 15-232, 70th Gen. Sess. (Colo. 2015).
31

H.B. 292, 2013 Leg. Sess. (N.M. 2013); S.B. 404, 2013 Leg. Sess. (N.M. 2013); S.J.M. 53, 2013 Leg. Sess.

(N.M. 2013); S.J.M 56, 2013 Leg. Sess. (N.M. 2013); and S.M. 93, 2013 Leg. Sess. (N.M. 2013); S.M 6, 52nd
Gen. Sess. (N.M. 2015); H.B. 291, 52nd Gen. Sess. (N.M. 2015); S.B. 483, 52nd Gen. Sess. (N.M. 2015); and
H.B. 102, 51st Gen. Sess. (N.M. 2014).
32

H.J.M. 13, 78th Gen. Sess. (Or. 2015); S.J.M. 5, 78th Gen. Sess. (Or. 2015); H.B. 3444, 78th Gen. Sess. (Or.

2015); and H.B. 3240, 78th Gen. Sess. (Or. 2015).
33

S.B. 5405, 64th Gen. Sess. (Wash. 2015); H.B. 1262, 64th Gen. Sess. (Wash. 2015); H.B. 1192, 64th Gen.

Sess. (Wash. 2015); H.B. 2268, 63rd Leg. 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014).
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Even distant states are joining the act. Georgia “encourage[s] the federal government to
imminently extinguish both its title and government jurisdiction on the public lands that are held in
trust by the United States and convey title and jurisdiction to willing States in which the federal
public lands are located.”34 Similarly, South Carolina encourages the U.S. Congress to “coordinate
the transfer of title to the western states.”35
The idea of transferring public lands to the states has also infused national politics, with the
Republican National Committee lending its support,36 and takeover advocates introducing multiple
bills during the 114th Congress that would transfer to the states title to or jurisdiction over public
lands.37 On the budgetary front, Senator Murkowski succeeded in amending the Senate’s 2016
budget proposal to authorize funding of “initiatives to sell or transfer to, or exchange with, a State

34

H.R. 106, 53d Genn. Sess. (Ga. 2015).

35

H.R. 3552, 120th Leg. Sess. (S.C. 2013-14).

36

See Republican Platform 2016 21 (“Congress shall immediately pass universal legislation providing for a

timely and orderly mechanism requiring the federal government to convey certain federally controlled public
lands to states. We call upon all national and state leaders and representatives to exert their utmost power and
influence to urge the transfer of those lands, identified in the review process, to all willing states for the
benefit of the states and the nation as a whole.”) https://prod-static-ngoppbl.s3.amazonaws.com/docs/2012GOPPlatform.pdf. See also, Republican National Committee, Resolution in
Support of Western States Taking Back Public Lands, adopted Jan. 24, 2014 available at
http://www.gop.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/RESOLUTION-IN-SUPPORT-OF-WESTERNSTATES-TAKING-BACK-PUBLIC-LANDS.pdf.
37

See e.g., S. 361, 114th Cong. (2015) (directing the Secretary of the Interior to sell specified federal public

lands), H.R. 435, 114th Cong. (2015) (same), H.R. 3650, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring the Secretary of
Agriculture, upon a request from a state, to sell that state up to 2 million acres of National Forest System
land), H.R. 925, 114th Cong. (2015) (directing grants of public land to the state of Nevada and its counties,
and requiring public land auctions), S. 472, 114th Cong. (2015) (same), H.R. 1484, 114th Cong. (2015)
(directing the secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior to convey without consideration to the state of
Nevada all interest in Forest Service and BLM lands), and H.R. 3650, 114th Cong. (2015) (authorizing states
to select and acquire National Forest System lands).
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or local government any [enumerated] Federal land.”38 In April 2015, Reps. Rob Bishop and Chris
Stewart launched “a congressional team that will develop a legislative framework for transferring
public lands to local ownership and control.”39 As Congressman Bishop explains:
This group will explore legal and historical background in order to determine the
best congressional action needed to return these lands to the rightful owners. We
have assembled a strong team of lawmakers, and I look forward to formulating a
plan that reminds the federal government it should leave the job of land
management to those who know best.40
While federal legislative efforts have thus far foundered, they represent an evolution in
approach that may avoid many of the legal pitfalls discussed in section III. With Republicans now in
control of both houses of Congress and the White House, the prospect of passing such legislation
has improved considerably.
2.

Transfer Rhetoric Fuels Revolt

The potential for land transfer rhetoric to embolden fringe groups and spur violent action is
a growing concern. As federal attorneys warned almost two decades ago:
The danger inherent in [ordinances exerting local control over federal land] is not
that they are being enforced by the counties that pass them — indeed, most are not.
The danger is that they encourage citizens to unlawful defiance of lawful federal land
management directives. These acts of defiance threaten federal land managers as they
carry out their statutorily mandated duties and may have serious ramifications, such
as the imposition of fines and the loss of grazing permits for citizens who act on the
legal theories touted by the movement.41
Cliven Bundy relied on transfer arguments in justifying armed resistance to federal land
management. Mr. Bundy had, since 1993, refused to pay federal grazing fees.42 Following years of

38

S. Amend. 838 to S. Con. Res. 11, 114th Cong. (2015), 161 Cong. Rec. S 1937 (March 25, 2015).

39

http://stewart.house.gov/flag.

40

Id.

41

Peter D. Coppelman, The Federal Government’s Response to the County Supremacy Movement, 12 NAT. RES. &

ENV’T 30 (1997).
42

United States v. Bundy, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23835, *1 (D. Nev. 1988).
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failed efforts to resolve the conflict and multiple court orders directing him to remove his cattle,43 all
of which were ignored, the District Court authorized the federal government to seize Bundy’s
trespassing cattle.44 The federal government began to roundup and auction off the trespass cattle,
with the proceeds set against Mr. Bundy’s more than $1 million in accumulated fees and fines.45 Mr.
Bundy resisted, seeking support from militia groups groups,46 and hundreds of armed supporters
flocked to the Bundy compound.47 The Department of the Interior backed down,48 avoiding
violence but emboldening anti-government sentiments: Senator Harry Reid (who criticized Mr.
Bundy), BLM employees, and environmentalist all found themselves the recipients of death threats.49
Mr. Bundy’s justification for his actions is eerily similar to the arguments proffered by
transfer movement supporters. In 1998 Mr. Bundy contended that the federal government lacked
authority over lands “inside an admitted state.”50 He therefore disputed the BLM’s “constitutional
authority over public lands,”51 and dismissed federal efforts to regulate grazing on federal public

43

See id., and U.S. v. Bundy, 1999 WL 33654616 (9th Cir. 1999).

44

United States v. Bundy, 2013 WL 3463610, *3 (D. Nevada 2013).

45

Statement from Director of the BLM Neil Kornze on the Cattle Gather in Nevada (April 25, 2014)

http://www.blm.gov/nv/st/en/info/newsroom/2014/april/national_office__statement.html.
46

RYAN LENZ & MARK POTOK, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., WAR IN THE WEST, THE BUNDY RANCH

STANDOFF AND THE AMERICAN RADICAL RIGHT (2014).
47

Criminal Indictment, United States v. Bundy, 2:16-CR-46 (D. Nev. Feb. 17, 2016).

48

Statement from Director of the BLM Neil Kornze, supra note 45.

49

Capitol Police Investigate Threats to Reid Amid Bundy Battle, GREENWIRE, April 29, 2014

http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1059998621; Phil Taylor, With Death Threats, Nev. Conflict
Highlights Dangerous Side of Public Land Management, GREENWIRE, April 17, 2014
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1059998078; Federal Worker Harassed at Gunpoint on Utah Highway,
GREENWIRE, May 8, 2014, http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1059999230.
50

United States v Bundy, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23835, *12-13 (D. Nev. 1988).

51

Id. at *7-8.
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lands as a “land grab,”52 claiming that he possess a “vested right” to graze cattle on the public
domain.53 These arguments evolved over the following fifteen years and by 2014 could be
summarized as: the Nevada Constitution’s disclaimer of title to federal public lands carries no legal
force; the Property Clause of the United States Constitution applies only to federal lands outside the
state borders; the United States’ exercise of ownership over federal lands violates the Equal Footing
Doctrine; and Nevada state law excuses his trespass.54
The Bundy debacle demonstrates the danger of allowing misconceptions regarding
ownership of public lands to continue. As the Department of Homeland Security explained:
[T]he belief among militia extremists that their threats and show of force against the
BLM during the April Bunkerville standoff was a defining victory over government
oppression is galvanizing some individuals — particularly militia extremists and
violent lone offenders — to actively confront law enforcement officials, increasing
the likelihood of violence. Additionally, this perceived success likely will embolden
other militia extremists and like-minded lone offenders to attempt to replicate these
confrontational tactics and force future armed standoffs with law enforcement and
government officials during 2014.55
On the heels of the Bunkerville fiasco, Phil Lyman, a County Commissioner from San Juan
County, Utah organized an ATV ride up Recapture Canyon. Recapture Canyon, which includes
public lands managed by the BLM, contains an unusually dense collection of Anasazi and Pueblo
Indian sites dating back more than 2,000 years,56 and was closed to vehicle access in 2007 because of

52

See Ted McDermott, Freedom Fighter, MISSOULA INDEPENDENT, June 12, 2014, available at

http://missoulanews.bigskypress.com/missoula/freedom-fighter/Content?oid=2054145.
53

United States v Bundy, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23835, *2 (D. Nev. 1988).

54

United States v. Bundy, 2013 WL 3463610, *2 (D. Nev. 2013).

55

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Intelligence Assessment, Domestic Violent Extremists Pose Increased Threat to

Government Officials and Law Enforcement 1, July 22, 2014 (on file with author).
56

Phil Taylor, Utah Official Plans Illegal ATV Ride Through BLM Canyon, GREENWIRE, April 15, 2014,

http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1059997933.
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damage to archaeological resources.57 Commissioner Lyman relied on transfer rhetoric to justify the
ride, questioning federal ownership and jurisdiction over the lands, and firing up an angry audience:
It’s a freedom that’s been taken without our consent. . . . We have power and
jurisdiction to do things independent of BLM. . . . As we approach independence
day, let us contemplate what it means to be free and what we are willing to do to
ensure that our children and their children inherit a free and flourishing San Juan
County. . . . Remember that our revolutionary forefathers did not declare war, they
declared independence, the war was only a consequence.58
The Recapture Canyon ride attracted many of the same anti-federal militants who flocked to
Mr. Bundy’s defense, and dozens of ATV enthusiasts descended on the canyon for the ride.59 While
Commissioner Lyman and a local blogger were convicted of conspiracy charges related to the ride,60
those convictions only exacerbate tensions.
Frustrations turned violent when, in late 2014, militants descended on Burns, Oregon to
protest the resentencing of two ranchers who had been convicted of arson after setting fire to public
lands in order to destroy evidence of poaching.61 The district court had imposed sentences that were
lighter than the required mandatory minimum sentence,62 the court of appeals ordered resentencing
in accordance with federal sentencing guidelines, and the two men were sent back to prison.63
Protests over resentencing quickly morphed into a broader protest over public land
management, and a small armed splinter group seized control of the nearby Malheur Wildlife

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Phil Taylor, BLM Pressured to Bring Illegal ATV Riders to Justice, GREENWIRE, May 13, 2014,

http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1059999494.
60

Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Lyman, 2:14-CR-470 (D. Utah Dec. 29, 2015).

61

Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office, District of Oregon, Eastern Oregon Ranchers Convicted of

Arson Resentenced to Five Years in Prison Oct. 7, 2015) (on file with authors).
62

United States v. Hammond, 742 F.3d 880, 881 (9th Cir. 2014).

63

Id. at 884-85.
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Refuge. The militants refused to leave until the imprisoned ranchers were released,64 the refuge was
handed over to adjacent private owners, the county was given control of the refuge, and ranchers
were given unfettered rights to graze cattle on refuge lands.65 The group’s leader and spokesman
Ammon Bundy “said the goal is to turn over federal land to local ranchers, loggers and miners.”66
Tensions escalated, the federal government closed nearby USFS and BLM offices because of
threats and intimidation against federal employees,67 and local schools were shuttered.68 On January
26, 2016, law enforcement officers attempted to arrest eight of the militants as they drove to a public
meeting about the occupation. A vehicle driven by one of the militants attempted to avoid a police
roadblock. One of the armed militants then attempted to flee the vehicle, reached towards a
weapon, and was shot and killed by Oregon State Patrol officers.69
The Malheur occupiers, like transfer advocates, claim that the United States could not own

64

The ranchers who had been convicted of arson quickly disavowed themselves from the militants,

explaining that the militants did not speak for the ranchers. Oregon Ranchers Reject Cliven Bundy Family
Occupation, CBS NEWS Jan. 3, 2016) available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/oregon-ranchers-rejectcliven-bundy-family-occupation/.
65

Les Zaitz, Demands by Oregon Standoff Leaders Defy Logic and Law, Authorities Say, THE OREGONIAN (Jan 23,

2016) available at http://www.oregonlive.com/oregonstandoff/2016/01/demands_by_oregon_refuge_occup.html.
66

Les Zaitz, Militia Takes Over Malheur National Wildlife Refuge Headquarters, THE OREGONIAN (Jan. 2, 2016)

available at http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwestnews/index.ssf/2016/01/drama_in_burns_ends_with_quiet.html.
67

Criminal Complaint at 6, U.S. v. Bundy et al., No. 3:16-mj-004-1 10-11 (D. Or. Jan. 16, 2016).

68

Fedor Zarkhin, Schools Near Oregon Standoff Site Reopen as Militant Occupation Continues, THE OREGONIAN (Jan.

11, 2016) available at http://www.oregonlive.com/oregon-standoff/2016/01/burnsarea_schools_reopen_as_a.html#incart_river_index_topics.
69

Robbie DiMesio, Oregon Standoff: Amon Bundy in Custody, 1 Dead, THE OREGONIAN (Jan. 26, 2016) available

at http://www.oregonlive.com/oregonstandoff/2016/01/oregon_standoff_ammon_bundy_re.html#incart_river_index_topics.
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the refuge lands because the Constitution does not permit the federal government to “forever retain
the majority of land within a state.”70 Mr. Bundy also justified his actions as a legitimate means of
bringing questions of federal constitutional authority before a court. Citing legal work commissioned
by the State of Utah, Mr. Bundy contended that “there was a legitimate legal basis for challenging
the constitutionality of federal land ownership,” and that lacking the almost $14 million Utah
anticipated to litigate these claims, Mr. Bundy “identified an alternative way to raise the legal
challenge.”71 The tragic ending to the Malheur standoff reminds us of earlier warnings: a key danger
of transfer rhetoric is in its ability to embolden those who feel disenfranchised to violent acts.72
II.

A Brief History of the Public Lands
A historic perspective regarding Western public lands is important because many “modern

problems in public land law grow directly out of that historical legacy. These stem largely from the
patchwork, haphazard character of federal disposal policies, and the sometimes dizzying patterns of
land ownership that have resulted.”73
A.

Acquisition of the Public Domain

The manner of land acquisition, the way in which newly acquired territories were governed,
and the rights that states secured when they were created out of federal territories, differ markedly
between East and West. The differences between state and territorial governance are at the heart of
“equal footing doctrine” considerations, which are addressed more deeply in section III. The

70

Order Resolving Round One Motions on the Pleadings, United States v. Bundy, 3:16-CR-51 (D. Oregon,

June 3, 2016). See also, Defendant Amon Bundy’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction,
United States. v. Bundy, No. 3:16-cr-00051 at 7 (D. Oregon May 9, 2016) ECF No. 527.
71

Defendant Ammon Bundy’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 21.

72

Peter D. Coppelman, The Federal Government’s Response to the County Supremacy Movement, 12 NAT. RES. &

ENV’T 30 (1997).
73

GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 147 (5th ed. 2002).
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original thirteen states’ title to land stems from the states’ victory in the Revolutionary War.74 The
original thirteen states possessed undiminished territorial sovereignty until they agreed to form a
central government and cede specified lands and powers to that government.75
Cession to the federal government occurred because landlocked states feared that states with
claims to the Western frontier would have disproportionate political and economic power.76 By
conveying their claims to the Western frontier to the federal government, states with expansive land
claims overcame a fear that threatened the Union. The lands ceded to the federal government were
conveyed subject to the expectation that the federal government would sell some lands to pay off
the states’ war debts — debts that the federal government assumed in return for the grants from the
states.77 New states would be created out of the Western frontier, with some lands passing out of
federal ownership and fueling our westward expansion.78
Farther West, Spain asserted title to much of the Southwest based on its conquest of North
America’s first inhabitants.79 In 1821 Mexico won the Mexican War of Independence, gaining its

74

See Definite Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Britain, Sept. 3, 1783, 1 Malloy 586 at art. I (1910).

See also, Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) (“when the revolution took place, the people of each state
became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and
the soils under them, for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the
constitution to the general government.”).
75

Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 318-19 (1866).

76

See, PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT, ch. III (1968).

77

Michael C. Blumm & Oliver Jamin, The Property Clause and its Discontent: Lessons from the Malheur Occupation 43

ECOLOGY L. Q. __ (forthcoming 2017).
78

Id.

79

Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 545 (1821). See also, JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 2-3 (1833) (“There is no doubt, that the Indian tribes, inhabiting
this continent at the time of its discovery, maintained a claim to the exclusive possession and occupancy of
the territory within their respective limits, as sovereigns and absolute proprietors of the soil.”).
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independence from Spain.80 Mexico claimed title to most of the Southwest until 1848, when the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the Mexican-American War.81 In return for cessation of
hostilities and $15 million, Mexico conveyed to the United States title to approximately 336 million
acres (525,000 square-miles) of land.82 Five years after ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, the United States purchased an additional 19 million acres (29,670 square-miles) from
Mexico, establishing the border between the United States and Mexico that exists today.83
The land obtained from Mexico was obtained with federal blood and treasure, and when
Mexico transferred title to land, it transferred it to the federal government of the United States.84
Similarly, all of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, as well as portions of Montana and Wyoming, were
acquired from Great Britain in 1846 as part of the Oregon Compromise.85 The remainder of
Montana, Wyoming, and a large portion of Colorado (among other states) were acquired from
France in 1803, via the Louisiana Purchase.86
Once this land was acquired by the federal government, Congress created federal territories
and set forth the manner in which those territories would be governed.87 As the Supreme Court

80

Title was claimed based on the right of discovery. Id. at §§ 2, 6. Spain and Mexico signed the Treaty of

Cordoba on August 24, 1821, ending the Mexican War of Independence. See TIMOTHY J. HENDERSON, THE
MEXICAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 177-78 (2010).
81

Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, 9 Stat. 922 (1848)

(hereinafter Guadalupe Hidalgo).
82

Id.

83

See Gadsden Treaty, U.S.-Mex., Dec. 30, 1853, as amended and ratified at 10 Stat. 1031 (1854).

84

Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 922 (1848). See also, U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the power

to enter into treaties with foreign powers exclusively to the federal government).
85

Treaty with Great Britain, 9 Stat 869 (1846).

86

Treaty Between the United States and the French Republic, 8 Stat. 200 (1803).

87

See e.g. An act to establish a Territorial Government for Utah, 9 Stat. 453 (1850). See also United States v.

Nye County, Nevada, 920 Fed. Supp. 1108, 1110 (D. Nev. 1996) (noting that lands were ceded to the United
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explained recently, “U.S. Territories . . . are not sovereigns distinct from the United States.”88 Rather,
territories are subsidiary to the federal government, depending on the federal government for
territorial powers of-self governance.89 In the Western territories the Territorial Governor,
Territorial Secretary, Territorial Supreme Court Justices, Territorial Attorney, and the Territorial
Marshall were all federal appointees.90 Territorial residents had the right to elect a “delegate” to
represent them in the U.S. House of Representatives,91 but these delegates could not vote,92 and
territorial residents did not have representation in the U.S. Senate.
Congress anticipated that territorial citizens would form governments of their own and
become states.93 This transition, however, was not self-effectuating.94 Normally, Congress passed
statehood enabling acts, territorial governments drafted a constitution in accordance with the
statehood enabling acts, and eligible voters within the territory adopted the draft constitution. Once
these steps were complete, Congress passed legislation admitting the latent state into the Union.95

States).
88

Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1866 (2016).

89

Id.

90

See e.g., an act to establish a Territorial Government for Utah, 9 Stat. 453, 456 (1850).

91

Id. at 457.

92

An Act further to regulate the territories of the United States, and their electing delegates to Congress, 3

Stat. 363 (1817). See also, Christopher M. Davis, Congressional Research Service, Delegates to the U.S.
Congress: History and Current Status 5 (Aug. 25, 2015) (discussing delegates under the Northwest
Ordinance).
93

See e.g., An Ordinance for the Governor of the Territory of the United States north-west of the river Ohio,

1 Stat. 51 (1787) (indicating that territories with a free population of 60,000 could obtain statehood).
94

Even Vermont, the first state admitted to the new Union, had to petition for and be granted statehood. See,

An Act for the Admission of the State of Vermont to this Union, 1 Stat. 191 (1791).
95

See e.g., An act to provide for the division of Dakota into two States and to enable the people of North

Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington to form constitutions and State governments and to be
admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original states, and to make donations of public land to
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Some territories had a more arduous path to statehood than others. Residents of the Utah Territory,
for example, petitioned for statehood seven times before Congress passed the Utah Enabling Act.96
Upon admission, newly minted states elected government officers, including a Governor,
and representatives to the upper and lower houses of the state legislature.97 Residents of the newly
admitted states would also elect Senators and Representatives for the upcoming session of
Congress.98 In short, citizens of the new state would assume all the political rights and sovereignty
afforded to residents of then existing states.
B.

Federal Land Ownership

The TPLA does not assert that Utah held original title to the land at issue, but instead speaks
of the federal government’s purported obligation to transfer title to federal public lands to the state.
Pundits,99 politicians,100 and even some scholars,101 however, characterize the transfer movement as

such States, 25 Stat. 676 (1889) (hereinafter Montana and Washington Enabling Act).
96

See generally, Stanley S. Ivins, A Constitution for Utah, XXV UTAH HISTORICAL QUARTERLY 95 (1957)

(recounting Utah’s path to statehood), and JEAN BICKMORE- WHITE, THE UTAH CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE (1998).
97

See e.g., Montana and Washington Enabling Act, 25 Stat. 676, 679 (1889).

98

See e.g., id. at 683.

99

See e.g., Ken Ivory on the Glen Beck Show (April 21, 2014) available at

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WDll5zHV2Dk (discussing how to “get the federal lands returned to
the states”)
100

Id. See also, comments of Senatorial candidate Champ Edmunds in, U.S. Senate Candidates Differ on Public

Land Philosophy, BILLINGS GAZETTE, May 7, 2014, available at
http://billingsgazette.com/news/opinion/guest/u-s-senate-candidates-differ-on-public-landsphilosophy/article_baff64c5-18ee-5425-95ea-0218c9533acc.html (“It’s time to return these lands to Montana
so that we can manage our forests, protect private property, implement responsible and sustainable harvest
programs, and reap the economic benefits that come from well-managed lands.”).
101

See Donald J. Kochan, Public Lands and the Federal Government’s Compact-Based “Duty to Dispose”: A Case Study

of Utah’s H.B. 148 — The Transfer of Public Lands Act, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1,133 (claiming the federal
government obtained the land at statehood), and Spencer Driscoll, Note, Utah’s Enabling Act and Congress’s
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an effort to “take back” lands that once belonged to the state. Utah, however, did not exist as a state
until 1896 when, following satisfaction of its enabling act obligations, it was proclaimed as such by
President Grover Cleveland.102 As Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story explained:
As the general government possesses the right to acquire territory, either by conquest
or by treaty, it would seem to follow, as an inevitable consequence, that it possess the
power to govern what it has so acquired. The territory does not, when so acquired,
become entitled to self government, and it is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
State. It must, consequently, be under the dominion and jurisdiction of the Union, or
it would be without any government at all.103
President Buchanan pulled no punches about federal ownership and control of public lands
when he ordered the army into Salt Lake City to quell secessionist efforts.
You have settled upon territory which lies geographically in the heart of the Union.
The land you live upon was purchased by the United States and paid for out of their
treasury. The proprietary right and title to it is in them, and not in you. Utah is
bounded on every side by States and Territories whose people are true to the Union.
It is absurd to believe that they will or can permit you to erect in their midst a
government of your own, not only independent of the authority which they all
acknowledge, but hostile to them and their interests.104
While influential politicians have long recognized that states cannot “take back” that which
was never theirs,105 those who ignore history or seek political advantage from populist fervor can

Enclave Clause Authority: Federalism Implications of a Renewed State Sovereignty Movement, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 999
(same).
102

Presidential Proclamation of January 4, 1896, 29 Stat. 876 (1896).

103

2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1324 (1880).

Justice Story reached the same conclusion in the first edition of his COMMENTARIES. 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1318 (1833).
104

Proclamation of the President of the United States to the People of Utah, CIS 974 S. Exec. Doc. No. 1/6

p. 69 (Oct, 23, 1858).
105

Utah’s former Senator, Robert Bennett, penned an op-ed to this effect. Robert Bennett, ‘Taking Back’

Federal Lands Unlikely, DESERET NEWS (Feb. 17, 2014) 2014 WLNR 4345107 (“I don’t see merit in the
argument that the federal government now has a legal obligation to give [Utah] ‘back” something they never
owned.”). See also, SCOTT M. MATHESON, OUT OF BALANCE 126 (1986) (former Utah Governor Matheson
states that he thought earlier state efforts to seize federal land were legally flawed and unlikely to succeed.).
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drown out more reasoned voices. Richard Lamm, former Governor of Colorado, distilled the
situation nicely more than thirty years ago:
The West had no conceivable legal claim to land that had never been its own. Legally
the West was wrong, but the questions it asked about its place on the public domain
went far beyond legalities into shadowy areas of ethics and morality where answers
did not come so easily. And in those areas western confusion and protest took on
more validity.106
C.

Federal Authority Over Land Pursuant to the Property Clause

The federal government’s authority over the lands it acquired is also clear. The U.S.
Constitution’s Property Clause states that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory and other Property belonging to the United
States.”107 As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he term territory, as here used, is merely descriptive
of one kind of property; and is equivalent to the word lands. And Congress has the same power over
it as over any other property belonging to the United States.”108
Prior sagebrush rebels and some of today’s transfer advocates109 contend that the Property
Clause granted the federal government only the power to “dispose of” land, leaving the United

Utah’s former Attorney General described the state’s threats of TPLA driven litigation as “a quixotic lawsuit
that stands no chance of success.” Paul Van Dam, Op-Ed: Attorneys General Know What They’re Talking About on
Public Lands, Salt Lake Tribune (Oct. 14, 2016).
106

RICHARD D. LAMM & MICHAEL MCCARTHY, THE ANGRY WEST: A VULNERABLE LAND AND ITS

FUTURE 215 (1982). Former Utah Governor Scott Matheson concurred in his colleague’s assessment, stating
that he had “little confidence in the legal arguments of the Sagebrush Rebels.” MATHESON, supra note 105 at
126 (1986).
107

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2.

108

United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 537 (1840).

109

Contemporary assertions are discussed in Report of the Public Lands Subcommittee Western Attorneys

General Litigation Action Committee Conference of Western Attorneys General 4 (2016).
https://wilderness.org/sites/default/files/CWAG%20Public%20Lands%20Subcommittee%20Report.pdf
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States without authority to retain lands in private ownership.110 While the TPLA does not adopt this
position, this assertion is often heard from other transfer advocates.111 The Property Clause’s power
to “dispose of” property, however, is not an obligation to dispose of property because Congress has
an “absolute right” to decide upon the disposition of federal land and “[n]o State legislation can
interfere with this right or embarrass its exercise.”112 The power to make decisions regarding
disposition includes the power to forego disposition and retain property in federal ownership.113
More than a century ago, the Supreme Court repelled an attack on the nascent National
Forest System, concluding that the federal government could retain public lands for broad national
benefits, and that it could do so indefinitely. In Light v. United States,114 a Colorado resident who had
been enjoined from grazing cattle on National Forest System lands attacked the injunction by
arguing that Congress could not withdraw public lands from settlement absent state consent. The
Court soundly rejected the argument, holding that the United States owns the public lands “and has
made Congress the principal agent to dispose of property,” which includes the right to “sell or
withhold [public lands] from sale.”115 As an owner and sovereign, “the United States can prohibit
absolutely or fix terms on which its property can be used. As it can withhold or reserve the land it

110

See e.g., United States v. Nye, 920 F. Supp. 1108, 1117 (D. Nevada 1996) (discussing claim that the

Constitution vests in Congress only the power to dispose of lands).
111

Defendant Ammon Bundy’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 21, United

States. v. Bundy, No. 3:16-cr-00051 (D. Oregon May 9, 2016) ECF No. 527.
112

Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 99 (1872) (upholding claim to land by a federal patent holder against a

competing claim reliant on state law).
113

Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 336 (1936) (holding that where the United States

holds title to a hydroelectric dam, all features incident to power generation and the electricity produced
“constitutes property belonging to the United States,” and the Property Clause does not constrain Congress’s
power to determine the terms of property dispossession).
114 220
115 Id.

U.S. 523 (1911).

at 536 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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can do so indefinitely.”116 Moreover, the United States holds the public lands “in trust for the people
of the whole country,” not solely for the benefit of adjacent landowners.117
Light is but one chapter in a long line of cases holding that “inclusion within a State of lands
of the United States does not take from Congress the power to control their occupancy and use . . .
and to prescribe the conditions upon which others may obtain rights in them.”118 With respect to
managing wildlife on federal public lands, a function normally ascribed to the states, the Supreme
Court opined that “[t]he argument appears to be that Congress could obtain exclusive legislative
jurisdiction over the public lands in the State only by state consent, and that in the absence of such
consent Congress lacks the power to act contrary to state law. This argument is without merit.”119
The breadth of the Property Clause is beyond dispute, and the broad view of the federal
government’s authority under the Property Clause comports with the intent of our nation’s founding
fathers.120
Indeed, attorneys for Utah and Wyoming appear to recognize the futility of the argument. In
Utah, the Office or Legislative Research and General Counsel appended a review note to the initial
draft of the TPLA, explaining that demanding transfer of title to the public lands to Utah, “would
interfere with Congress’ power to dispose of public lands. Thus, that requirement, and any attempt

116 Id.
117 Id.
118

at 537.

Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1917) (holding that the Enclave Clause does

not require cession of state jurisdiction over federal lands and that the United States retains authority under
the Property Clause).
119

Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 541 (1976). According to Fischman & Williamson, Kleppe signals that

the Supreme Court will rely primarily on the legislative process to determine the limits of the Property Clause
of the U.S. Constitution. Fleischman & Williamson, supra note 4.
120

Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation”: The Property Clause and Federal Regulation of Private

Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 16 (2001).
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by Utah in the future to enforce the requirement, have a high probability of being declared
unconstitutional.”121 The Office of the Wyoming Attorney General reached a similar conclusion,
opining that “because the legal bases [sic] for Utah’s demands depend upon a repeatedly rejected
reading of the United States Constitution and a strained interpretation of Utah’s statehood act,
Utah’s claims will likely fail in court.”122
More recently, the occupiers of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge contended that the
court lacked jurisdiction because “the Constitution does not permit the federal government to
‘forever retain the majority of land within a State’ and, thus, to exercise its current ownership over
federal lands including the [Refuge].”123 The court held otherwise, explaining that the federal
government never relinquished title to the lands at issue, and that “‘Oregon never had any claim to
sovereignty prior to its admission to the Union,’ and, therefore, ‘it had no basis to claim
independence or ownership of land.’”124 Since the land at issue remained U.S. property, the court
then concluded that “the United States’ exercise of regulatory jurisdiction over the [refuge] is
authorized by the Property Clause [of the U.S. Constitution], and, therefore, this Court has
jurisdiction over the charged offenses that allegedly took place on the [refuge].”125
With ownership of and control over the public domain securely in federal hands, Western

121

H.B. 148, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah). The legislative review note was appended to the introduced version of

the bill and is available at: http://le.utah.gov/~2012/bills/static/HB0148.html.
122

Memorandum from Jeremiah I. Williamson, Assistant Attorney General, to Jerimiah L. Rieman, Natural

Resource Policy Advisor, re: Utah Transfer of Public Lands Act 1 (May 4, 2012) (on file with author).
123

United States v. Bundy, et al., 3:16-cr-00051-BR, Order Resolving Round One Motions on the Pleadings

11 (D. Or. June 3, 2016).
124

Id. at 14, quoting Office of the Attorney General, State of Oregon, Op. No. 8237, 48 Or. Op. Atty. Gen. 1,

1995 WL 400487, at *3 (Jul. 7, 1995).
125

United States v. Bundy, et al., 3:16-cr-00051-BR, Order Resolving Round One Motions on the Pleadings

15 (D. Or. June 3, 2016).
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states can only claim the right to title to federal public lands by demonstrating a legal obligation
requiring the federal government to convey public land to the states. Before turning to that issue we
must first understand about how public lands have been treated over time.
D.

Federal Disposal of the Public Domain

The federal government encouraged westward expansion by selling or granting land to
homesteaders, miners, ranchers, railroads, and others, conveying over 512 million acres (over
800,000 square-miles) of land into private ownership.126 The federal government made similarly
expansive grants to the new states. Upon statehood, all Western states were granted the right to title
to specified federal lands. Granted lands could be leased or sold by the states, generating revenue to
support purposes such as funding public schools and universities, hospitals, and construction of a
state capitol.127 Statehood grants were made to each of the eleven contiguous Western States and
ranged from 2.7 million acres in Arizona to 12.4 million acres in New Mexico.128 See Table 1.

State
Arizona
California
Colorado
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
Oregon
Utah
Washington
Wyoming
Total

Public
Schools
8,093,156
5,534,293
3,685,618
2,963,698
5,198,258
2,061,967
8,711,324
3,399,360
5,844,196
2,376,391
3,472,872
51,341,133

Public
Colleges &
Other
Buildings Universities
100,000
396,000 1,900,000
6,400
196,080 2,693,965
32,000
137,680
578,080
32,000
186,080
482,187
182,000
186,080
463,120
12,800
136,080
512,800
132,000
562,702 3,040,000
6,400
136,080 3,543,402
64,000
356,080 1,150,000
132,000
136,080
400,000
107,000
136,080
532,480
806,600
2,565,022 15,296,034

Total
10,489,156
8,430,738
4,433,378
3,663,965
6,029,458
2,723,647
12,446,026
7,085,242
7,414,276
3,044,471
4,248,432
70,008,789

126

BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 2015, 5 (2106).

127

See e.g., An Act to Enable the people of Utah to form a constitution and State government, and to be

admitted to the Union on an equal footing with the original states, 28 Stat. 107, 109-10 (1894) (hereinafter the
Utah Enabling Act).
128

GATES, supra note 76 at 804-05.
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Table 1 -- Federal Land Grants to States129
Even under modern policies dictating that “public lands be retained in Federal ownership,
unless . . . it is determined that disposal of a particular parcel will serve the national interest,”130 the
BLM still managed to dispose of over 24 million acres of land between 1990 and 2010 — more land
than the entire state of Indiana.131
E.

Federal Retention of the Public Domain

While federal land policy long-favored disposal, it is clear that disposal was always balanced
against by federal land retention policies. It is also true that disposal was limited by the low
economic value of some lands that were available to miners, loggers, and homesteaders.
The federal government has a long history of retaining land in federal ownership. Beginning
in 1785, Congress reserved to the federal government four sections of land in each township; plus
one section to support the maintenance of schools in that township, “a certain proportion equal to
one seventh of all the land surveyed [ ] to be distributed to the late continental army,” and a onethird interest in gold, silver, lead, and copper found on federal land.132 Since at least 1786, the federal

129

Id. at App. C.

130

43 U.S.C. § 1710(a)(1) (2012).

131

ROSS W. GORTE ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 16

(2012). Congress also continues to dispose of public land when doing so is in the public interest. See e.g., Pub.
L. No. 112-138 (2012) (granting land to the town of Alta, Utah), Pub. L. No. 106-460 (2000) (granting land to
the Landusky, Montana School District), and Pub. L. No. 103-346 (granting land to the City of Imperial
Beach, California).
132

CURTIS H. LINDLEY, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW RELATING TO MINES AND MINERAL LANDS

WITHIN THE PUBLIC LAND STATES AND TERRITORIES AND GOVERNING THE ACQUISITION AND
ENJOYMENT OF MINING AND ENJOYMENT OF MINING RIGHTS IN LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 36
(1897). See also, An Ordinance for Ascertaining the Mode of Disposing of Lands in the Western Territories,
May 20, 1785 available at https://www.loc.gov/resource/bdsdcc.11201/?st=gallery.
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government has set aside portions of the public domain as a homeland for Native Americans.133 In
1796 Congress reserved to the federal government salt springs and adjacent lands.134 Withdrawals for
what would become National Parks began as early as 1832.135 Yellowstone National Park was set
aside on March 1, 1872.136 In 1891, Presidents were authorized to withdraw National Forests from
disposal,137 leading to reservations of millions of additional acres of land. In 1920, the Mineral
Leasing Act directed that hydrocarbons and other valuable minerals be retained in federal ownership
and available for development only through government issued leases.138 In 1934 Congress enacted
the Taylor Grazing Act,139 effectively withdrawing “all public lands within the exterior boundaries of
such a proposed grazing district from all forms of entry and settlement.”140
Furthermore, as the Office of the Idaho Attorney General recently opined, the disparity in

133

See Treaty with the Choctaw, 7 Stat. 21 (1786) (allocating lands “within the limits of the United States of

America” and which are “under protection of the United States of America” to the Choctaw Nation). Prior to
ratification of the U.S. Constitution and formation of a unified federal government, individual colonies set
aside land for Native Americans, so federal reservation policy is an extension of even older colonial policies.
134

An Act providing for the Sale of the Lands of the United States in the territory northwest of the river

Ohio, and above the mouth of the Kentucky river, 1 Stat. 464, 466 (1796).
135

An Act authorizing the governor of the territory of Arkansas to lease the salt springs in said territory, and

for other purposes, 4 Stat. 505 (1832) (withdrawn lands would become Hot Springs National Park).
136

An Act to set apart a certain Tract of Land lying near the Head-waters of the Yellowstone River as a public

park, 17 Stat. 32-33 (1872).
137

Withdrawals to create forest reserves, which later became national forests, occurred under authority

granted by An act to repeal timber-culture laws, and for other purposes, 26 Stat. 1095, 1102-03 (1891).
138

An Act To promote the mining of coal, phosphate, oil, oil shale, gas, and sodium on the public domain, 41

Stat 437-51 (1920) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (2012)).
139

An Act To stop injury to the grazing lands by preventing overgrazing and soil deterioration, to provide for

their orderly use, improvement, and development, to stabilize the livestock industry dependent on the public
range, and for other purposes, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (2012)
(hereinafter the Taylor Grazing Act).
140

43 U.S.C. § 315 (2012).
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federal land ownership is at least partly attributable to “the fact that many of the lands in Idaho were
not suitable for homesteading.”141 Between 1822 and 1884 the federal government made almost 408
million acres of pubic land available for sale,142 only forty-four percent of which was sold.143 As of
1905, there were still almost 450 million acres of the United States that remained unreserved and
open to settlement.144 Of these acres, over 418 million acres were in the eleven contiguous Western
states.145 The lands that remained were the most difficult to earn a living off of, as settlers selected
the best and most valuable lands first.146
The federal government tried to give additional public land to the states, but many states
refused. In 1932 President Hoover convened a committee to investigate turning over the public
domain to the states. While Congress drafted legislation giving public lands to the states,147 those
bills died for lack of Western support.148 States were reluctant to acquire the public domain because
the proposed grants excluded sub-surface minerals, and states feared that if they accepted the land
they would lose federal reclamation funds, mineral revenue, and highway funds while incurring

141

Letter from Steven W. Stract, Assistant Attorney General, to Representative Ilana Rubel, re: House Bill

582, Idaho Multiple Uses Sustained Yield Act 2 (March 14, 2016) (on file with author). As the letter correctly
notes, the shift in federal policy from disposal to reservation was also a factor.
142

GATES, supra note 76 at 802.

143

Id. at 802.

144

Id. at 502.

145

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE, 59th Cong. 1st Sess., H. Doc. 4958

5/2, 383 (1905).
146

Gary M. Anderson & Dolores T. Martin, The Public Domain and Nineteenth Century Transfer Policy, 6 CATO J.

905, 910 (1987).
147

See S. 17, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), S. 2272, 72nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1932), and S. 4060, 72nd Cong., 2d

Sess. (1932).
148

Don B. Colton, Control of the Public Domain: A National or State Function?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1932, pp. 1,

11 (“if I sense general Western sentiment correctly, and I have had an excellent opportunity to observe it, the
West is not in favor of such legislation.”).
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increasing administrative costs.149
Physical realities also played an important role in Western settlement. Average annual
precipitation in Boise, Idaho, and Salt Lake City, Utah, for example, average just 11.6 and 18.6
inches respectively. By comparison, annual precipitation in Springfield, Missouri and Columbia,
South Carolina average 45.5 and 44.3 inches annually.150 It was no surprise then that federal
programs like those set forth in the Homestead Act failed in the West.
[T]he provisions of the Homestead Act were totally inapplicable to arid-region
conditions. A 160-acre tract was much too small for grazing — the only practicable
use to which the land could be put without irrigation. Acquisition and improvement
of land for irrigation were not possible without expenditures of capital which were
infinitely beyond the means of the homesteader. . . . [Similarly, t]he Desert Land Act
of 1877 permitted one, upon a small payment, to acquire up to 640 acres of arid land,
provided he would irrigate it — a virtual impossibility.151
Even in fertile river valleys, rapid snowmelt could cause devastating floods, and rugged topography
combined with the cost of reservoir and irrigation system development to slow development. Until
the 1920s and the birth of large federal irrigation projects, much of the Intermountain West was
simply too dry for productive homesteading and agriculture.152 Ironically, while these federal

149

UTAH CONST. DEF. COUNCIL, REPORT ON UTAH’S TRANSFER OF PUBLIC LANDS ACT H.B. 148, 17-19

(2012) (hereinafter CDC REPORT) (quoting George Dern, then Governor of Utah).
150

See usclimatedata.com.

151

4 WATER & WATER RIGHTS 41.02 (Amy K. Kelley, ed. 3d ed. 2016) (internal citations omitted).

152

Groundwater development was even more problematic, with limited groundwater development occurring

in the Southwest or the High Plains until the 1930s and ‘40s, when the combination of high capacity pumps
and rural electrification made widespread groundwater development feasible. S.A. Leake et al., U.S.
Geological Survey, Ground-Water Resources for the Future, Desert Basins of the Southwest (no date) available at
pubs.usgs.gov/fs/0086-00/report.pdf (discussing groundwater development in Arizona), and Steven L.
Rhodes and Samuel E. Wheeler, Rural Electrification and Irrigation in the U.S. High Plains, 12 J. RURAL STUDIES
311 (1996) (noting that in the 1930s rural electrification “played a central role in the development of the High
Plans agricultural economy . . . by delivering energy to well pumps that made large-scale irrigation farming
possible.”).
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irrigation projects made the Intermountain West more habitable,153 they also brought with them the
large federal work force that some Westerners now criticize.154
Disposal laws applied equally across the country, but the Western landscape was simply less
hospitable to settlers. To this day, land ownership reflects these realities: on average, Western
counties with more arable land have a higher percentage of land in private ownership than counties
where arable land are in short supply.155
III.

Legal Arguments for Public Land Disposal
Arguments in favor of transferring the public domain to the states are of either a legal or

policy nature, though the latter are often used to convince the public of the merit of the former. As
the legal and policy arguments for a public land transfer suggest different remedies, litigation for the
former and legislation for the latter, sections III and IV of this article treats them as separate.
Making sense of the TPLA’s legal claims is complicated by odd timing — the act was passed
before the legal theories behind it were developed fully (or at least expressed publicly). While the
TPLA demands that the United States give 31.2 million acres of land to Utah, weak claims to title
and strong enabling act disclaimers have forced transfer advocates to pivot towards demanding
public land “disposal,” potentially to a broader suite of recipients. Both the TPLA and the evolving
legal theory are addressed here.
Legal arguments underpinning the TPLA and its progeny invariably tie back to federal
legislation setting forth the conditions residents of federal territories were required to meet if they

153

See Paul W. Gates, The Intermountain West Against Itself, supra note 4 at 227 (explaining that states could not

have funded large irrigation projects and that reclamation therefore needed to be a federal endeavor).
154

Robert L. Glicksman, supra note 4 at 662-63.

155

See Paul M. Jakus et al., Western Public Lands and the Fiscal Implications of a Transfer to States, 34 LAND ECON.

___ (forthcoming 2017) (finding a statistically significant relationship between the amount of private land
ownership in a county and the quality of land that was available for disposal).
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were to form states and join the Union. Statehood enabling acts, for example, guarantee that new
states would be admitted on an “equal footing” with previously admitted states, which some
contend requires conveying land out of federal ownership. Enabling acts also generally granted
states a percentage of the proceeds of public land sales, and discuss “extinguishing” title to certain
lands, language that some interpret as demanding public land disposal.
A.

Equal Footing / Equal Sovereignty

The equal footing doctrine holds that “all states are admitted to the Union with the same
attributes of sovereignty (i.e., on an equal footing) as the original 13 states.”156 The Utah Enabling
Act, like acts enabling admission of other Western States, explicitly guaranteed that Utah would be
admitted on an equal footing with the existing states.157
The equal footing doctrine traces its roots to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pollard v.

156

Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 203 (1999).

157

See Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107-12 § 4 (1894). See also, An Act To enable the people of New Mexico to

form a constitution and state government and be admitted to the Union on an equal footing with the original
States; and to enable the people of Arizona to form a constitution and state government and be admitted into
the Union on an equal footing with the original States, 36 Stat. 557, 561 (1910) (hereinafter New Mexico and
Arizona Enabling Act); An act to provide for the admission of the State of Wyoming into the Union, and for
other purposes, 26 Stat. 222, 222 (1890) (hereinafter Wyoming Enabling Act); An act to provide for the
admission of the State of Idaho into the Union, 26 Stat. 215 (1890) (hereinafter Idaho enabling Act); Montana
and Washington Enabling Act 25 Stat. 676, 679 (1889); An act to enable the people of Colorado to form a
constitution and State government, and for the admission of said State into the Union on an equal footing
with the original states, 18 Stat. 474 (1875) (hereinafter Colorado Enabling Act ); An Act to enable the People
of Nevada to form a Constitution and State Government, and for the Admission of such State into the Union
on an Equal Footing with the original States, 13 Stat. 30, 30 (1864) (hereinafter Nevada Enabling Act); AN
Act for Admission of Oregon into the Union, 11 Stat. 383, 383 (1859) (hereinafter Oregon Enabling Act); An
Act for the Admission of the State of California into the Union, 9 Stat. 452 (1850) (hereinafter California
Enabling Act).
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Hagan,158 which involved competing claims to title to submerged lands. Georgia, as one of the
original thirteen states, obtained title to the land at issue following the Revolutionary War,159 and
ceded title to the lands at issue to the federal government. Upon Alabama’s admission to the Union
the federal government granted the disputed land to Alabama, retaining all navigable water as
“public highways.” The dispute turned on whether this provision reserved land title in the federal
government. Since the original states held title to submerged lands as an attribute of sovereignty
stemming from their victory in the Revolutionary War, and new states were admitted on an equal
footing with the original states, the Court held that Alabama was entitled to the submerged lands.160
In Utah and other Western states, far more land is federal owned. Ownership matters both
because of the control it implies, and because federal lands are exempt from state and local taxes.161
Thus, transfer proponents argue, continued federal ownership deprives states of control as well as
the tax base needed to fuel economic growth.162 Federal lands also cannot be condemned by the
state which, they contend, deprives states of a critical tool needed for community growth and self-

158

44 U.S. 212 (1845).

159

See Definite Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Britain, Sept. 3, 1783, 1 Malloy 586 at art. I (1910). See also, Martin v.

Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) (“when the revolution took place, the people of each state became
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils
under them, for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the constitution to the
general government.”).
160

Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 230 (1845).

161

As a condition on admission into the United States, western states also agreed that federal property was

nontaxable. See e.g., Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894). See also, United States v. State Tax Comm’n,
412 U.S. 363 (1973) (holding that federal lands cannot be subjected to local taxing authority).
162

Davallier Law Group, Legal Analysis of the Legal Consulting Services Team Prepared for the Utah

Commission for the Stewardship of Public Lands, ___ (2015). But see section ___, infra for a discussion of
federal payments to states intended to compensate states for revenue foregone because of federal land
ownership.
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governance.163 Together, transfer advocates argue, these ills make Western states second class states
and sub-equal sovereigns. It follows then, according to transfer advocates, that the federal
government must dispose of almost all of the remaining public domain, as it did east of the
Mississippi River, in order to assure that Western states obtain a level of sovereignty on par with
their Eastern peers.164 The equal footing doctrine and theories of equal sovereignty, however, cannot
be contorted to compel this conclusion.
First, the equal footing doctrine simply does not apply to dry land.165 Second, the equal
footing doctrine pertains to political rights and sovereignty rather than economic status or
condition.166 As the Supreme Court explains:
The ‘equal footing’ clause has long been held to refer to political rights and to
sovereignty. It does not, of course, include economic stature or standing. There has
never been equality among the States in that sense. Some States when they entered
the Union had within their boundaries tracts of land belonging to the Federal
Government; others were sovereigns of their soil. . . . Area, location, geology, and
latitude have created great diversity in the economic aspects of the several States.
The requirement of equal footing was designed not to wipe out those diversities but
to create parity as respects political standing and sovereignty.167
A factually analogous case out of Nevada is illustrative, as it addresses the equal footing doctrine as
well as other popular pro-transfer arguments.
In the 1996 case of United States v. Gardner,168 the Gardners held a permit to graze cattle on
National Forest System lands. The USFS suspended the Gardners’ permit following a wildfire,
providing time for vegetation to reestablish. The Gardners resumed grazing prematurely, ignoring an

163

Davallier Law Group, supra note 163 at 62-72.

164

Id. at 55-99.

165

Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229, 244 (1913).

166

See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950).

167

Id.

168

107 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir. 1996).
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order to remove their cattle and pay fees for unauthorized grazing. The United States sued for
damages to the range and to enjoin the Gardners from further grazing. The Gardners contended,
among other things, that under the equal footing doctrine, “a new state must possess the same
powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction as did the original thirteen states upon admission to the
Union . . . [so] Nevada must have ‘paramount title and eminent domain of all lands within its
boundaries’ to satisfy the Equal Footing Doctrine.”169
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the Gardners’ arguments unavailing, reiterating
the Supreme Court’s holding that the equal footing doctrine “applies to political rights and
sovereignty, not the economic characteristics of the states.”170 The doctrine is not intended to
“eradicate all diversity among states but rather to establish equality among the states with regards to
political standing and sovereignty.”171 Accordingly, the equal footing doctrine cannot be used to
force the federal government to extinguish title to federal public lands just because few such lands
now exist outside of the Western United States.
There is no question that Western lands came into the United States as federal territory.172 It
is equally clear that under the Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which Utah concedes is the
“supreme law of the land,”173 Congress has an “absolute right” to decide upon the disposition of
federal land.174 “[I]nclusion within a State of lands of the United States does not take from Congress
the power to control their occupancy and use . . . and to prescribe the conditions upon which others
169

Id. at 1318.

170

Id. at 1319.

171

Id. (citing United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950)).

172

See e.g., the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 922 (1848) (ending the Mexican-American War and

vesting title to what is now Utah in the federal government of the United States).
173

Utah Const. art. I, § 3.

174

Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 99 (1872) (upholding claim to land by a federal patent holder against a

competing claim reliant on state law).
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may obtain rights in them.”175 Congressional authority to prescribe management requirements
applicable to federal lands arises from the United States Constitution, which predates every enabling
act, and grants Congress power to place limits on disposal of federal lands to all present and future
states. Indeed, the equal footing doctrine does not prevent Congress from placing limits on a state
via a statehood enabling act, provided that Congress has authority to place those limits on states that
already have been admitted.176
What the equal footing doctrine does do is guarantee Western states equivalent political
rights and sovereignty — and that is precisely what Western states obtained at statehood. As
residents of federal territories, Westerners were on a decidedly unequal footing, as they were unable
to elect their governor, judges, or other high officials.177 They also lacked voting representations in
Congress.178 Admission to the Union guaranteed Westerners equal treatment under the law.
The promise contained in the equal footing doctrine has been fulfilled, and while there is no
doubt that differences in condition exist, those differences cannot be spun into an entitlement to the
public domain. As, the Office of the Attorney General for the State of Idaho recognizes, that equal
footing doctrine based claims to the public domain have “no support in the law,”179 and as the
Conference of Western Attorneys General recently concluded:
Court precedents . . . provide little support for the proposition that the principles of
equal footing or equal sovereignty may compel transfer of public lands to the
western states. The Court has been given ample opportunity to apply such principles
to public lands but, when given the opportunity to do so, it has repeatedly
175

Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1917) (holding that the Enclave Clause does

not require cession of state jurisdiction over federal lands and that the United States retains authority under
the Property Clause).
176

Branson School Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998).

177

See supra, notes 87 through 98 and accompanying text.

178

Id.

179

Letter from Steven W. Strack, Deputy Attorney General to Representative Ilana Rubel, re: House Bill 582,

Idaho Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act 2 (March 14, 2016) (on file with author).
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distinguished property issues as independent from the ‘limiting or qualifying of
political rights and obligations’ that may trigger additional scrutiny under equal
sovereignty principles.180
B.

Enclave Clause Claims

The “Enclave Clause” of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “exercise
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever over [the District of Columbia] and to exercise like
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same
shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-Yards, and other needful
Buildings.”181 Some transfer backers contend that purchase with state legislative consent is the only
way in which the federal government can legitimately acquire and retain property, and in 2012, the
Utah Legislature enacted a joint resolution stating that because of the Enclave Clause, “the federal
government is only constitutionally authorized to exercise jurisdiction over and above bare right and
title over lands that are ‘purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same
shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful
Buildings.’”182 That is simply not the case.
Indeed, the federal government purchased almost 530 million acres (over 23 percent of the
total land area of the U.S.) from France via the Louisiana Purchase, over 378 million acres via the
Treaty with Russia for the Purchase of Alaska, as well as hundreds of millions of additional acres
from Great Britain, Mexico, and Spain.183 This land was acquired pursuant to the federal
government’s treaty making power,184 and is managed pursuant to the Property Clause of the U.S.

180

Conference of Western Attorneys General, supra note 109 at 47.

181

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.

182

See e.g., H.J. Res. 3, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012).

183

PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 2015, supra note 126 at 3.

184

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Constitution.185 As the Supreme Court long ago explained:
[S]ince the adoption of the constitution, [the federal government has] . . . , by cession
from foreign countries, come into the ownership of a territory still larger, lying
between the Mississippi river and the Pacific ocean, and out of these territories
several states have been formed and admitted into the Union. The proprietorship of
the United States in large tracts of land within these states has remained after their
admission. There has been, therefore, no necessity for them to purchase or to
condemn lands within those states, for forts, arsenals, and other public buildings,
unless they had disposed of what they afterwards needed. Having the title, they have
usually reserved certain portions of their lands from sale or other disposition, for the
uses of the government.186
The attorneys general of eleven of twelve Western states concur, concluding that “the clear
weight of relevant decisions by the United States Supreme Court is to the effect that ownership of
the public lands by the federal government is not limited to those purposes set forth in the Enclave
Clause.”187
C.

The Extinguish Provision

Some also contend that statehood enabling acts promise to “extinguish” title to the public
domain — a promise breached by the federal government and remedied by either giving the land to
the states or by other means of disposal. History casts doubt on their interpretation.
In return for statehood and land grants, Utah agreed to disclaim right and title to additional
federal public lands. The statutory disclaimer of title to all other federal lands was incorporated into
the Utah Constitution and states:
That the people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and declare that they forever
disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the
boundaries thereof; and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any
Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished
by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the
United States.188
185

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

186

Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 532 (1885).

187

Council of Western Attorneys General, supra note 109 at 21.

188

Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894). The language in the Utah Constitution is substantively
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Similar language is also found in the Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Washington state enabling acts.189
Those contending that enabling acts obligates the federal government to dispose of public
lands claim “that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United State, the same shall
be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States” obligates the Federal government to
dispose of federal public lands.190 They then argue that the state’s disclaimer of the right to
additional land is inoperative because the federal government breached its obligation to dispose of
those lands.191 Nothing could be further from the truth.
Legislation must be interpreted in light of congressional intent,192 and historic context and
events.193 When enabling acts speak of disclaiming title “until the title thereto shall have been
extinguished by the United States,” Congress was referring to ongoing efforts to extinguish
American Indian land claims. The House of Representatives confirmed its intent in its report on the
Utah Enabling Act:
The convention shall also provide that the proposed State of Utah shall forever
disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the
boundaries thereof, and all lands lying within the limits of the State owned or held by
any Indian or Indian tribes, and until the Indian title shall have been extinguished by the
United States, such Indian reservation shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United

equivalent. See UTAH CONST. art. III.
189

The Idaho and Wyoming enabling acts are slightly different, stating that they “shall not be entitled to any

further or other grants of land for any purpose other than as expressly provided in this act.” Idaho Enabling
Act, 26 Stat. 215, 217 (1890) and Wyoming Enabling Act, 26 Stat. 222, 224 (1890).
190

Kochan, supra note 101 at 1154 (quoting the Utah Enabling Act (emphasis added)).

191

Id.

192

Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) (“Our task is to give effect to the will of

Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive.”).
193

Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
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States.194
The Senate agreed with the House’s assessment of the intention behind this clause195 — a
clause that apparently generated little controversy even if the language in the House Report and that
in the enabling act differ slightly. In subsequently admitting Arizona and New Mexico to the Union,
Congress resolved any further question of intent, confirming that “absolute jurisdiction and control”
remain with Congress “until the title of such Indian or Indian Tribes shall have been extinguished.”196
The rush to end Indian land ownership occurred because an influx of returning Civil War
veterans swelled demand for land. Efforts to remove Indians from lands desired by white settlers
and to settle Indians upon reservations proved insufficient to keep up with the demand for land.
“There was no place left to remove the Indian, and there was little sympathy for the preservation of
a way of life that left farmlands unturned, coal unmined, and timber uncut. Policymakers had
determined that the old hunter way and new industrial way could not coexist.”197
Accordingly, Congress enacted the General Allotment Act of 1887 (the Dawes Act)198 to
address settlers’ demand for valuable farmland. Under the Dawes Act, tribal members surrendered
their undivided interest in the tribally owned reservation in return for title to a parcel of land that
was allotted to them individually.199 Upon approval of the allotments, the Secretary of the Interior
issued patents, which were held in trust for the benefit of Indian allottees200 until conclusion of the

194

H.R. REP. NO. 53-162, at 18 (1893) (emphasis added).

195

S. REP. NO. 53-414 (1894).

196

New Mexico and Arizona Enabling Act, 36 Stat. 557, 569 (1910) (emphasis added).

197

COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.04 (2015).

198

An act to provide for the allotment of lands in severalty to Indians on the various reservations, and to

extend the protection of the laws of the United States and the Territories over the Indians, and for other
purposes, 24 Stat. 388-391 (1887) (hereinafter the Dawes Act).
199

Id.

200

Id.
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trust period, when title to the allotment transferred to individual Indians.201 Additional lands were
held in common by the tribe, and “surplus” land was subject to disposal,202 meaning it was made
available for white settlers.203
Allotment proved to be an effective tool in extinguishing Indian land ownership. “In 1887,
when the Dawes Act provided for allotting tribal lands to individual Indians, the American Indian’s
heritage in land totaled 138 million acres. Less than 50 years later, when the allotment policy was
abandoned, only 48 million acres were left in Indian hands.”204
Notably, the Dawes Act became law in 1887. None of the pre-1887 statehood enabling acts
refer to “extinguishing” title to lands. However, the enabling acts authorizing admission for eight of
the next ten states, including Utah, all contain the extinguish provision.205
Reading “extinguishment” as referring to Indian land title also comports with Utah’s history.
President Lincoln created the Uintah Valley Indian Reservation in 1861.206 In 1864 Congress

201

Id.

202

Id.

203

COHEN, supra note 197, § 1.04; see also, Marc Slonim, Indian Country, Indian Reservations, and the Importance of

History in Indian Law, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 517, 522 (2009).
204

COHEN, supra note 197, § 1.04.

205

Montana and Washington State Enabling Act, 25 Stat. 676 (1889) (also includes North Dakota and South

Dakota); Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107 (1894); An Act To enable the people of Oklahoma and of the
Indian Territory to form a constitution and State government and be admitted into the Union on an equal
footing with the original States; and to enable the people of New Mexico and of Arizona to form a
constitution and State government and be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original
States, 34 Stat. 267 (1906) (hereinafter Oklahoma Enabling Act); New Mexico and Arizona Enabling Act, 36
Stat. 557 (1910). Idaho and Wyoming were both admitted to the Union in 1890, after petitioning Congress
for statehood; the acts recognizing the petitions and granting admission are therefore slightly different for the
enabling acts of their sister states.
206

Exec. Order of October 3, 1861, reprinted in Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1157 (D. Utah

1981).
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directed the Secretary of the Interior to “cause the several Indian reservations . . . in the territory of
Utah, excepting the Uinta Valley, to be surveyed into tracts or lots, not exceeding eighty acres each .
. . and upon completion of said surveys shall cause said tracts or lots to be sold.”207
In 1888, Congress modified the Uintah Valley Indian Reservation, declaring certain lands
within the Reservation’s boundaries “to be the public lands of the United States and restored to the
public lands.”208 “Restored” lands were to be “disposed of at public or private sale in the discretion
of the Secretary of the Interior.”209
In 1894, Congress authorized allotment of the Uncompahgre Indians’ reservation,210
“restoring” lands that were “unsuitable” for allotment to the public domain.211 After approval of the
allotments, these public lands were opened to entry under homestead and mineral laws.212
In 1897, Congress mandated the allotment and opening of the Uncompahgre Reservation.213
No allotments were made before the land was opened to settlement, though Congress confirmed
eighty-three allotments by separate legislation.214 One year later, the Uncompaghre Reservation was
opened to homesteaders and the remaining lands became part of the public domain. That same year
the federal government began making allotment to Indians upon the Uintah Indian Reservation and

207

An Act to vacate and sell the present Indian Reservations in Utah Territory, and to settle the Indians of

said Territory in the Uinta Valley, 13 Stat. 63 (1864).
208

An act to restore to the public domain a part of the Uintah Valley Indian Reservation, in the Territory of

Utah, and for other purposes, 25 Stat. 157 (1888).
209

Id. at sec. 2.

210

Act of August 15, 1894, sec. 20, 28 Stat. 286, 337-38.

211

Id., sec. 20.

212

Id., sec. 21.

213

Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62.

214

Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah 716 F.2d 1298, 1306-07 (10th Cir. 1983).
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to claiming all unallotted lands to the United States.215
Similar laws, joint resolutions, and presidential proclamations were enacted in 1902,216
1903,2171904,218 and 1905,219 removing portions of the Uintah Valley Indian Reservation for use as
National Forests, reservoir sites, townsites, and opening reservation lands for homesteading and
mineral withdrawals. From the initial reservation, 1,010,000 acres were added to what is now the
Uinta National Forest; 2,100 acres were designated as townsites; 60,260 acres were set aside for
reclamation and reservoir purposes; 2,140 acres were entered as mining claims; and 1,004,285 acres
were opened to homestead entry.220

215

Act of June 4, 1898, ch. 376, 30 Stat. 429.

216

Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245, 263-64, see also 35 Cong. Rec. 6069 (1902) (authorizing the

Secretary of the Interior, with consent of the Uintah and White River Bands, to allot the Uintah reservation
prior to October 1, 1903, with “surplus” lands being restored to the public domain); Joint Resolution No. 31
of June 19, 1902, 32 Stat. 744 (1902).
217

Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat. 982, 997-98 (reiterating the 1902 Act’s direction to allot the Uintah

reservation, subject to the consent of the Uintah and White River Bands, with surplus lands being restored to
the public domain. The Uintah and White River Bands did not consent to allotment).
218

Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 189, 207-08 (extending the deadline for allotting the Uintah

reservation, subject to the consent of the Uintah and White River Bands, as set forth in the 1902 and 1903
acts. The Uintah and White River Bands did not consent to allotment).
219

Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048, 1069-70 (providing for inclusion of Uintah Valley

Reservation timberlands in the Uintah Forest Reserve and authorizing allotment, by Presidential
proclamation, without first obtaining the consent of the Uintah and White River bands, and opening certain
unallotted lands under the homestead and town-site laws); Presidential Proclamation of July 14, 1905, 34 Stat.
3116 (providing for inclusion of Uintah Valley Reservation timberlands in the Uintah Forest Reserve);
Presidential Proclamation of July 14, 1905, 34 Stat. 3119 (opening to entry all unalloted and unreserved lands;
Presidential Proclamation of July 31, 1905, 34 Stat. 3139 (reserving and disposing of townsites); Presidential
Proclamation of August 3, 1905, 34 Stat. 3141 (reserving reservoir sites); Presidential Proclamation of August
14, 1905, 34 Stat. 3142 (reserving and disposing of townsites).
220

ROBERT KEITER ET AL., LAND AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ISSUES RELEVANT TO DEPLOYING IN-

SITU THERMAL TECHNOLOGIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY TOPICAL REPORT 113 (2011).
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In short, while Utah was pursuing statehoood, the federal government was actively
extinguishing Indian land ownership. Reservations were being reduced, allotments were being
created with the expectation that federal trust obligations would be terminated, and that Indian land
title would be extinguished. When the Utah Enabling Act mentions “extinguishing title” claims, this
is precisely what Congress was referring to, and what Utah’s residents understood.
D.

Denial of the Benefit of the Bargain

Utah also argues that disposal of unreserved public lands was intended to provide a source
of revenue to federal, state, and local government, and that failure to dispose of federal lands denies
state and local governments the benefit of the statehood bargain.221 Because federal lands are not
subject to state or local taxes,222 and more economic development would presumably occur on these
lands if they were transferred to the states, continued federal ownership leaves states without the
promised benefits of the statehood bargain.
Under the Payment in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) program, local governments receive payments
in accordance with their population and the amount of federally owned land within their borders.223
Similarly, the U.S. Forest Service pays twenty-five percent of its receipts to states in order to support
roads and schools in the counties where national forests are located.224 During FY2014, PILT and

221

UTAH CONST. DEF. COUNCIL, TOWARDS A BALANCED PUBLIC LANDS POLICY, A CASE STATEMENT

FOR THE H.B. 148: UTAH’S TRANSFER OF PUBLIC LANDS ACT

3-4 (2012) (hereinafter CDC CASE

STATEMENT).
222

E.g., United States v. State Tax Comm’n of Mississippi, 412 U.S. 363 (1973).

223

31 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(1) (2012).

224

16 U.S.C. § 500 (2012). See also, ROSS W. GORTE, KRISTINA ALEXANDER & M. LYNNE CORN, CONG.

RES. SERV., FOREST SERVICE PAYMENTS TO COUNTIES — TITLE I OF THE FORESTS COUNTY REVENUES,
SCHOOLS, AND JOBS ACT OF 2012: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2012). Forest Service payments declined
substantially during the 1990s, primarily due to reductions in timber sales. In the Secure Rural Schools and
Community Self-Determination Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-393, Congress addressed these declines by creating
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Forest Service payments combined totaled over $727 million, more than $557 million of which went
to the eleven contiguous Western States.225 The BLM and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service also share a
portion of non-mineral based receipts generated on public lands with state and local governments.226
In addition, the Mineral Leasing Act guarantees states 48-percent of the revenue derived
from leased mineral development occurring on federal lands.227 Revenue is shared with the states to
offset lost tax revenue and to support local schools and infrastructure,228 “giving priority to those
subdivisions of the State socially or economically impacted by development of minerals . . . for (i)
planning, (ii) construction and maintenance of public facilities, and (iii) provision of public
services.”229 Total federal land payments to Utah and the eleven contiguous Western states, including
Mineral Leasing Act payments, are summarized in Table 2 and totaled $266 million and $3.8 billion
respectively in 2014.230 Payments to the eleven contiguous Western States accounted for 91.9
percent of all federal land payments to states.231
States also impose severance taxes on commodities extracted from the land, including land
owned by the federal government,232 as well as property taxes on equipment associated with

an optional alternative payment system for National Forest System land, providing more predictable funding.
225

HEADWATERS ECON., A PROFILE OF FEDERAL LAND PAYMENTS, economic data produced with the

Economic Profile System-Human Dimensions Toolkit available at
http://headwaterseconomics.org/tools/eps-hdt.
226

See 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2012) (grazing) and 16 U.S.C. § 715s (2012) (wildlife refuges).

227

30 U.S.C. §§ 191(a) and (b) (2012).

228

58 Cong. Rec. H. 7769-71 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1919) (debating the Mineral Leasing Act).

229

30 U.S.C. § 191(a) (2012). Revenues due to the State of Alaska are subject to a different formula. This is an

increase over the 37.5 percent allocated to states in the initial act. 41 Stat. 450 (1920); 30 U. S. C. § 191 (1970
ed.).
230

Headwaters Econ., supra note 226.

231

Id.

232

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) (upholding a thirty-percent state severance
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commodity production or even the value of the commodities themselves.233 Severance taxes alone
generated more than $2.9 billion for the eleven contiguous Western states during 2014.234
It difficult to square $3.8 billion in federal land payments and billions more in tax revenue
from development on federal land with claims that states have been denied the benefit of the
bargain.

tax on coal mined from federal land).
233

See e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-2-201(1)(a)(v) and (vi) (2014) (tax valuation of mining properties).

234

Cheryl Lee et al., U.S. Census Bureau, State Government Tax Collections Summary Report: 2014 7 (2015).
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State
Arizona
California
Colorado
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
Oregon
Utah
Washington
Wyoming
Total

Severance
Taxes
$26,190,000
$38,686,000
$245,087,000
$6,004,000
$305,614,000
$111,395,000
$1,066,343,000
$23,424,000
$155,743,000
$41,950,000
$883,025,000
$2,903,461,000

PILT
Payments
$34,497,956
$45,298,833
$34,530,642
$28,579,192
$28,809,242
$25,439,484
$37,677,905
$17,680,594
$37,903,225
$19,272,636
$27,143,411
$336,833,120

Forest
Service
Payments
$14,233,459
$33,699,465
$12,785,953
$25,971,900
$20,355,836
$3,980,106
$10,224,819
$65,324,385
$10,099,253
$19,972,728
$4,179,360
$220,827,264

BLM
Payments
$958,851
$(21,570)
$846,240
$1,652,554
$3,739,764
$2,623,024
$3,150,333
$39,020,429
$1,346,364
$49,762
$2,373,515
$55,739,266

46
USFWS
Refuge
Payments
$120,122
$936,682
$570,361
$49,934
$261,651
$70,815
$107,448
$288,005
$57,662
$538,396
$414,164
$3,415,240

Federal
Mineral
Royalties
$17,821
$104,096,729
$171,674,589
$5,552,387
$38,164,481
$7,206,707
$579,084,340
$287,703
$216,648,402
$4,799
$2,060,219,563
$3,182,957,521

Total
$76,044,399
$222,734,825
$465,739,872
$67,815,971
$397,250,588
$150,826,531
$1,697,654,188
$146,048,540
$421,953,649
$81,830,271
$2,978,238,038
$6,706,136,872

Table 2 -- Payments from Federal Lands and State Severance Taxes FY 2014235

235

Severance tax data from Lee et al., supra note 234 at 7. Federal land payments from Headwaters Economics, supra note 226.

last updated: January 10, 2017

** DRAFT **
E.

47

A Disposal Obligation, if it Exists, Does Not Require Gifts to States

With its case in doubt the TPLA’s demand that the federal government give Utah our public
lands have evolved into a more general contention that the federal government is obligated to
dispose of the public domain.
Statehood enabling acts specifically granted land to states for multiple purposes and required
states to disclaim all other claims to land. In Utah’s case, the federal government gave the newlyminted state land to support: “common schools,”236 “university purposes,”237 an agricultural
college,238 a school for miners,239 a normal school,240 a reform school,241 an “institution for the
blind,”242 an “insane asylum,”243 a “deaf and dumb asylum,”244 a miners hospital,245 to support
construction of the state capital,246 and to fund construction of irrigation reservoirs.247 By
enumerating these purposes Congress made clear that intended to grant land for these purposes and
no others. And if any ambiguity remained, Congress made clear that the “State of Utah shall not be
entitled to any further or other grants of land for any purpose than as expressly provided in this
Act.”248 To now interpret legislation as requiring disposal of almost the entire public domain would

236

Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107, 109 (1894).

237

Id. at 109.

238

Id.

239

Id. at 110.

240

Id.

241

Id.

242

Id.

243

Id.

244

Id.

245

Id.

246

Id. at 109.

247

Id. at 110.

248

Id.
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make Congress’ carefully enumerated grants superfluous.249
Accordingly, even if a duty to “extinguish” title or dispose of the public domain is held to
exist, there is no guarantee that the land transferred out of federal ownership would be conveyed to
the states, or that states would not be required to pay for any lands they do receiveIf additional
public land disposal is required, states like Utah may either need to pay for any land that they
receive, or the land may need to go to non-state entities. Indeed, if the public domain is to be
disposed of, one can argue that land should be sold at market value in order to maximize revenue
generation for the American people.250 The breach alleged by transfer backers, in short, does not
necessitate the remedy set forth in the TPLA.
F.

“Shall” and the Promise to Sell the Public Domain?

The Utah Enabling Act, like all other Western enabling acts, states that “five percentum of
the proceeds of the sale of public lands within the State, which shall be sold by the United States
subsequent to admission of said State into the Union . . . shall be paid to the said state.”251 Transfer
backers contend that “shall” is a term of obligation,252 relieving the federal government of discretion
to retain the lands in question, and failure to dispose of enough of the public domain is a breach of

249

“It is, however, a fundamental principal of statutory construction that effect must be given, if possible, to

every word, clause and sentence of a statute so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant.” In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 627 F.2d 1346, 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (internal
citations omitted).
250

A recent bill proposed market value public land sales, citing the potential revenue raised by the sales and

the need to pay down the national debt as justification for disposal. See H.R. 2657, 113th Cong. 2d Sess. § 1
(2013).
251

Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107, 110 (1894) (emphasis added).

252

Kochan, supra note 101 at 1157-58 (“This mandatory language removes from the federal government the

choice to never dispose and instead retain such lands.”).
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the federal government’s duty to dispose.253
While it is true that “shall” is normally a term of obligation,254 two important exceptions
exists. First, “shall” may be used to show “something that will take place or exist in the future.”255
For example, “we shall arrive tomorrow.” This definition of “shall” was included in legal dictionaries
in use at the time of Utah’s admission to the Union and therefore presumably understood by
Congress.256 Second, at the time of the Utah Enabling Act’s passage, “shall” was understood to have
different meanings when used against the government and non-government entities. At the turn of
the nineteenth century, “shall” meant “[m]ay, when used against a government; and must, when
used under other circumstances.”257
Shall should be interpreted as it was understood at statehood, indicating that at some point
in time the federal government may choose to sell portions of the public domain, and if it does so,
five-percent of sale proceeds must go to the state. Texts purportedly obligating the sovereign to
convey away lands are “strictly construed against the grantee.”258 To reinterpret statutes that have
been in place for more than a century to create vast and poorly defined obligations requires clear
indicia of congressional intent. That intent simply has not been established.

253

Id.

254

See e.g., Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (“The mandatory

‘shall’ . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.”).
255

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. See also www.oxforddictionaries.com

(defining shall as “expressing the future tense.”), www.merriam-webster.com (shall “used to say that
something is expected to happen in the future.”).
256

1 FREDERICK STROUD, THE JUDICIAL DICTIONARY OF WORDS AND PHRASES JUDICIALLY

INTERPRETED 722 (photo. reprint 2003) (1890).
257

1 ARTHUR ENGLISH, A DICTIONARY OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN ANCIENT AND MODERN LAW

728 (1899).
258

Shivley v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 10 (1894); see also U.S. v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 55 (1997).
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Another challenge posed by transfer backers strained interpretations “extinguish” and
“shall” is that even assuming additional public land disposal is required, how much land must be
disposed of remains a matter of congressional discretion. The Constitution grants Congress power
over the public lands, and it is up to the federal government to decide how much of the public
domain to dispose of.259 As noted earlier, the federal government began exempting portions of the
public domain from disposal well before Western states joined the Union.260 Congress, when it did
embrace disposal, determined the size of grants to states, settlers, and railroads. The federal
government also dictated the size of reservations set aside to support Native Americans, as well as
reservations creating our national forests, national parks, national monuments, and a host of other
uses. Interpreting “shall” to create a vague obligation would open a Pandora’s Box of unintended
consequences, creating new and nebulous obligations that threaten the very fabric of the American
West.
G.

Statute of Limitations

Finally, even if states do come up with a cognizable claim to the public domain, their long
delay in making their case may prove fatal to their claims. The federal Quiet Title Act bars claims
made more than twelve years “after the date the State received notice of the Federal claims to the
lands.”261 Knowledge of the alleged breach combined with “substantial improvements or substantial
investments [by a federal lessee or right of way grantee,] or on which the United States has
conducted substantial activities pursuant to a management plan such as range improvement, timber

259

See e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 336 (1936) (“It lies in the discretion of the

Congress, acting in the public interest, to determine how much of [it’s] property it shall dispose.”).
260

See supra, section II.E.

261

28 U.S.C. § 2409a(i) (2012). The former Solicitor of the U.S. Department of the Interior identified statute

of limitations concerns more than three decades ago, and transfer advocates have yet to offer a solid rebuttal.
See John D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics and Federal Lands, supra note 3 at 334.
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harvest, tree planting, mineral activities, farming, wildlife habitat improvement, or other similar
activities” would trigger the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations.262 As the Tenth Circuit recently
clarified:
The twelve-year period begins to run when the United States gives notice that it does
not recognize (or will not continue to recognize) the legitimacy of a claimant’s use of
federal lands. In other words, the period begins when the Quiet Title Act claimant
knew or should have known of the existence of some assertion — some claim — by
the government of an adverse right. The assertion by the United States need only be
sufficient to put potential plaintiffs on notice of the need to timely bring a quiet title
action to protect their rights. This is as an exceedingly light trigger for starting [the]
twelve-year clock running. But it is a necessary one because we are required to
strictly construe the twelve-year limitation period in favor of the United States.263
According to Utah, FLPMA’s 1976 enactment marked the end of public land disposal
policies.264 Moreover, Utah concedes that “[a]t various points throughout the 20th century, Utah
restated [it’s objections to public land retention] particularly upon the passage of FLPMA, wherein
the policy shift to one of land retention and preservation became express federal law.”265 Utah, like
her sister states, therefore knew or should have known of their claims by at least 1976.
For decades the BLM has also made a “substantial investment” in resource inventories and
management planning. The BLM has also “conducted” such “substantial activities” as mineral
leasing and development, range and habitat improvement projects, fire suppression, recreation
management and more “pursuant to a management plan.”266 By at least 1983, the BLM had prepared
either Resource Management Plans or Management Framework Plans for all BLM administered
lands in Utah.267 By 2001, the Utah BLM had issued 4,762 rights-of-way across BLM managed lands,

262

28 U.S.C. § 2409a(i) (2012).

263

San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d 787, 793 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).

264

UTAH CONST. DEF. COUNCIL, REPORT ON UTAH’S TRANSFER OF PUBLIC LANDS ACT, H.B. 148 6 (2012).

265

Id.

266

28 U.S.C. § 2409a(i) (2012).

267

See, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Dep’t. of the Interior, Planning, www.blm.gov/ut/st/en/prog/planning.html.
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and 86,851 such rights-of-way nationwide.268 In 2001 the Utah BLM was also administering livestock
grazing permits to 1,372 separate permitees that authorized grazing by over 1 million head of
livestock.269 In 2001 the Utah BLM already had 881,319 acres in oil and gas production (over 11.4
million acres nationwide),270 and was administering eighteen recovery plans for twenty-two
threatened, endangered, or ESA candidate species.271 Taken together, these kinds of activities were
likely to set in motion the twelve-year statute of limitations — particularly in light of the
“‘exceedingly light’ trigger ‘for starting [the] twelve-year clock running.’”272
Characterizing inadequate disposal claims as a quasi-contractual breach of the enabling acts’
promise to dispose of the public domain does not resolve the problem.273 “[E]very civil action
commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years
after the right of action first accrues.”274 If, as the state appears to contend, FLPMA’s enactment
marked the end of the disposal era and thereby breached the United States’ obligation to dispose of
more of the public domain, states’ contract-based claims are also time-barred.
If the state overcomes the statute of limitations hurdle it must still contend with a laches
defense.275 Laches, of course, “is defined as neglect to assert a right or claim which, taken together

268

BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 2001 Table 3-4 (2012).

269

Id. at Table 3-7a.

270

Id. at Table 3-17.

271

Id. at Table 5-10.

272

San Juan Cnty. v. U.S., 754 F.3d 787, 793 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).

273

One prominent scholar suggests that if ordinary contract rules apply, statehood enabling acts should be set

aside because of a mutual mistake of key terms, causing states to revert to territorial status. John D; Leshy,
Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics and Federal Lands, supra note 3 at 325.
274

28 U.S.C. § 2501(a) (2012).

275

Ironically, one of the first to identify laches as a possible barrier to state claims was also a proponent of

state transfer efforts. Albert W. Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: Constitutional Issues Surrounding Federal
Ownership of the Public Lands, 12 PACIFIC L. J. 693, 704-05 (1981).
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with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party, operates as a bar
in court of equity.”276 Given the longstanding nature of state grievances and the decades-long delay
in filing suit, the United States appears to have a plausible laches defense.
Further complicating matters for Utah, its own state law directs that:
(1) The state may not bring an action against any person for or with respect to any
real property . . . based on the state’s right or title to the real property, unless:
(a) the right of title to the property accrued within seven years before any
action or other proceeding is commenced; or
(b) the state or those from whom it claims received all or a portion of the
rents and profits from the real property within the immediately preceding seven
years.
(2) The statute of limitations in this section runs from the date on which the state or
those whom it claims received actual notice of facts giving rise to the action.277
That the federal government is a “person” under the statute is not in dispute.278 The question
therefore becomes whether the state’s “right or title to the property accrued within seven years
before any action or proceeding is commenced.”279 Rights to the lands in question “accrued” to the
state as early as 1896 with Utah’s admission to the Union and no later than 1976, with enactment of
FLPMA, as Utah concedes that FLPMA’s enactment gave notice that the federal government did

276

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Abridged 6th ed. 1991).

277

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-201 (2014). While state law also indicates that “[a]ctions against the federal

government regarding real property and that are subject to the federal Quiet Title Act . . . do not expire under
this chapter,” UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-118 (2014), this provision is unlikely to apply because the state is
not claiming ownership of the lands in question, but rather, asserting that the federal government was
statutorily obligated to dispose of the land. The cause of action, therefore, is unlikely to proceed under the
Quiet Title Act.
278

See Abdo v. Reyes, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (D. Utah 2015) (remanding to state court rule on applicability of

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-118 in a dispute over road rights of way involving the state and federal
governments).
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not intend significant additional public land disposal.280
The next question is whether, under subpart (b), either the state or the federal government
received rents or profits “from the real property within the immediately preceding seven years.”281
For public lands subject to mineral leases, grazing leases, or other revenue generating uses, collection
of rents or royalties would appear to prevent the tolling of this statute. However, which federal lands
have generated revenue during the prior seven years is another question of fact that, when applied
across a 31.2 million-acre landscape, will drive extensive fact-finding and litigation. There is also an
irony that ranchers who refuse to pay grazing fees to operate on federal lands because they dispute
federal land ownership may, in so doing, undermine state efforts to take back the public lands.282
Failure of legal theories aside, it would be a mistake to dismiss the transfer movement as
sound and fury signifying nothing. The transfer movement taps into intense feelings, and the threat
of litigation is an effective way of keeping land management policy in the public eye. Antagonism
towards a federal government increasingly painted as out of touch and inefficient, and the promise
of local control over public lands have become powerful rallying cries for a disenfranchised
electorate. With an incoming administration that is fixated on deregulation, one can imagine a
strategic shift from litigation to federal legislation transferring either ownership or control over the
public domain to the states. The fight, in short, appears poised to take on a stronger policy focus.
IV.

Policy Considerations and Unintended Consequences
The promise of “better” or “more efficient” management is an often-heard argument in

favor of ceding public lands to the states. This section first discusses policy arguments for conveying
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REPORT ON UTAH’S TRANSFER OF PUBLIC LANDS ACT, supra note 264 at 6.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-118(1)(b) has remained effectively unchanged since at least 1953. See UTAH

CODE ANN. § 78-12-2 (1953).
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See the discussion of the Bundy family, supra section I.B.2.
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the public domain to the states,283 and then turns to what state management policies may involve.
While policy arguments about being a “better” manager argument do not create a legally cognizable
right to wrest control of the public domain from the federal government, federal versus state
management capacity is relevant to a broader discussion about public land management and
legislative responses to the ills perceived by transfer advocates.
A.

Policy and Economics

Some argur that land should be turned over to the states because they would be more
efficient managers. The Property and Environment Research Center (PERC) points out that state
land managers earned an average of $14.51 for every dollar spent on trust land management
compared to $3.11 for every dollar spent by the BLM.284 State trust lands and federal multiple use
lands, however, are managed for different purposes. State trust lands are managed to maximize
revenue generation,285 while federal multiple use lands are managed for a broader suite of values,
including non-revenue producing values such as wilderness, habitat, water quality, and scenery.286
“These differing management objectives, while not the only reason, is [sic] a significant reason for
the differences in the cost to manage and the revenue generated from School Trust lands versus
federal public lands.”287
Changing the manager without changing the management mandate is unlikely to produce
more efficient or lower cost management. As the Cato Institute explains:
283

For an additional inventory of challenges inherent in devolving expansive public land to the states see,

Michael C. Blumm, The Case Against Transferring BLM Lands to the States, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL L. J. 387 (1996).
284

HOLLY FRETWELL & SHAWN REGAN, DIVIDED LANDS: STATE VS. FEDERAL MANAGEMENT IN THE

WEST 9 (2015) http://www.perc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/150303_PERC_DividedLands.pdf.
285

See e.g. Utah Code Ann. § 53c-1-302(1)(b)(iii) (2014) (setting forth Utah’s trust land managers mandate to

maximize revenue production).
286

See e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(7) and 1702(c) (2012) (BLM’s multiple-use mandate).
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STUDY ON MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC LANDS IN WYOMING, Y2 Consultants iii (2016).
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Examination of state land management policies indicates that state governments are
no better managers than are federal bureaucrats. They are just as economically
inefficient, ecologically short-sighted, and politically driven as their federal
counterparts. . . . The fundamental problem is, not federal incompetence, but the
political allocation of natural resources to favored constituencies, which subsidizes
some at the expense of others and inflicts harm on both the ecological system and
the economy as a whole. Transferring land to the states will only change the venue of
those political manipulations.288
PERC similarly ontends that states’ hopes of generating more revenue depend on changing the
management mandate, not the manager.289
A direct transfer of lands to the states under similar rules and regulations as federal
lands is unlikely to result in lower costs or higher revenues. On the other hand, if the
transferred lands are managed like state trust lands, their fiscal performance may
improve, but land management practices and existing rights could be affected in
important ways.290
Economists hired by the State of Utah concluded that “in Utah, state land management
agencies do not enjoy a cost advantage over federal agencies.”291 Similarly, a study commissioned by
the state of Wyoming concluded that transferring management obligations to the state without also
transferring ownership — and therefore authority to re-define management objectives — would do
little address frustrations over public land management. The same federal statutory framework
would apply and the “conflicts encountered would largely be the same for the state that exist under
present management.”292 In short, the mandate, not the manager, is the critical difference.
1.

The Cost of Managing the Targeted Lands

Critically, much of the revenue the federal government collects from public lands is already

288

Randal O’Toole, Should Congress Transfer Federal Lands to the States? CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS NO.

276 (1997).
289

FRETWELL & REGAN, supra note 284 at 29-30.

290

Id. at 10.
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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 7 at __.

292

STUDY ON MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC LANDS IN WYOMING, supra note 287 at Viii.
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directed back to the states where the development occur. It is therefore the marginal revenue, not
gross revenue, that must exceed expenses if states are to avoid financial disaster.
Managing the targeted public lands within Utah is estimated to cost the state $248.0 million
annually.293 A transfer of federally managed public lands to the states would also reduce state
revenue. Statesreceive a share of the revenue derived from the use of public lands.294 Future state
receipts from the targeted public lands depends on the amount of development that occurs, the
price of the commodities produced, and the percent of revenues returned to the state. Over the past
decade, mineral leasing (primarily oil, natural gas, and coal) produced, on average, ninety-three
percent of all revenue from public lands in Utah.295 Over the last decade, total federal land revenue
sharing payments to Utah (excluding PILT) averaged $186.8 million annually.296 Additionally, PILT
payments offset tax revenue foregone because federal lands are not subject to state and local taxes.297
Utah intends to offset lost PILT payments, which are routed to counties with federal lands, by
paying equivalent sums to the counties.298 Over the last ten years, Utah’s PILT payments averaged
$34.2 million annually.299

293

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 7 at 150.

294

For example, under the federal Mineral Leasing Act, forty-eight percent of this revenue is distributed to

the state where the development occurs. 30 U.S.C. §§ 191(a) and (b) (2012).
295

Headwaters Econ., unpublished data on file with author. See also, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 7 at

xxvi. Other federal laws require revenue sharing for non-mineral revenue and account for the remaining
seven percent of revenue. See e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 715s (2012) (wildlife refuges), and 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2012)
(grazing).
296

Headwaters Econ., unpublished data on file with author. Mineral revenue sharing payments are highly

volatile and in 2011 totaled $289.2 million for Utah; four years later, mineral revenue sharing payments fell to
$116.2 million. Id.
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31 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(1) (2012).
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Considered together, Utah would need to generate approximately $469.0 million annually
from the acquired lands to maintain current revenue distributions while offsetting new management
expenses: $248.0 million for new management costs, plus $186.8 million to maintain ongoing
programs that are currently funded by federal revenue sharing, plus $34.2 million to offset lost PILT
payments.
These costs occur against a backdrop of a multi-billion dollar maintenance backlog.300 Utah
will inherit this deferred maintenance obligation if it acquires federal public lands. Even if Utah can
dramatically increase revenue and cut expenses, increasing cash flow will take time. Where will Utah
find the money to manage the public’s lands during the intervening years? Will Utah forego resource
management or seek to subsidize management by diverting revenue from another source? Will Utah
be forced to sell lands or collateralize lands and bond against future revenue production, as
proposed in Nevada?301
2.

Covering Management Costs

Whether Utah could generate sufficient additional revenue from the targeted lands depends
on the amount of revenue generated from those lands and the percentage of any marginal increase
in revenue generation that Utah could capture. Economists commissioned by the state found that

mineral royalties. Between 2008 and 2015, Utah’s PILT annual receipts ranged between $35.6 and $38.0
million. In contrast, annual federal mineral revenue sharing payments ranged from $116.2 to $289.2 million.
Id.
300

The Congressional Research Service estimated the Department of the Interior and USFS’s total backlog at

$19.56 billion in 2010. CONG. RES. SERV., FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 20 (2012).
Data are not broken out by state, but with over 31 million acres of land under BLM and USFS management,
Utah’s costs are likely to be substantial.
301

A REPORT OF THE NEVADA LAND MGMT. TASK FORCE TO THE NEVADA INTERIM COMM. ON PUBLIC

LANDS: CONG. TRANSFER OF PUBLIC LANDS TO THE STATE OF NEVADA PURSUANT TO A.B. 227 OF THE
2013 NEVADA LEGISLATIVE SESSION 3 (2014) (on file with author).
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during 2013, total revenue from the public lands targeted by Utah totaled $331.7 million.302 With
costs exceeding revenue by $137.3 million annually, balancing the budget will pose a challenge.303
With ninety-three percent of revenue from the targeted public lands tied to mineral
development,304 Utah’s ability to break even links directly to future mineral production volumes,
prices, and revenue sharing. On December 31, 2015, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil sold
for $37.13 per barrel, and natural gas sold for $2.34 per thousand cubic feet.305 The U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA) expects global oil inventories to continue to build, keeping
downward pressure on oil prices.306 Accordingly, the EIA expects WTI crude oil prices to average
$38 per barrel in 2016, rising to $47 per barrel in 2017.307 Natural gas prices are projected to rise to
$2.70 per thousand cubic feet in 2016 and $3.31 in 2017.308
Utah crude oil sells at a discount compared to WTI. This discount fluctuates over time,
averaging $5.36 per barrel between January 1986 and July 2014.309 With WTI selling for around $37

302

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 7 at 125.

303

A 2016 assessment by the Utah Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel estimated

management costs at $125 to $275 million annually. The Office concluded that marginal revenue would
increase by $102 to $127 million annually. Based on mid-range estimates, management costs would exceed
new revenue by $85.5 million annually. Utah Office of Legislative Research and General Council, Fiscal Note
H.B. 276, 2016 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016) http://le.utah.gov/~2016/bills/static/HB0276.html.
304

See supra note 295.

305

Oil and gas spot pricing date was obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration at

http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm (oil) and at
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_pri_fut_s1_d.htm (natural gas). Natural gas pricing was quoted per million
BTUs, and converted to cubic feet based on 1,027 BTUs per cubic foot.
306

U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK 5 (Jan. 2016) at

http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/pdf/steo_full.pdf (last accessed Jan. 13, 2016).
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Id. at __.

309
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per barrel and prices projected to increase by $9 per barrel through 2017, it follows that Utah crude
oil will sell for between $32 and $41 per barrel over the next two years.
Low hydrocarbon prices mean low mineral royalty revenue. Recent economic modeling
considered a scenario under which oil sells for an average of $62 per barrel (Utah First Purchase
Price), natural gas for $3.30 per thousand cubic feet, and Utah increases the projected number of
wells drilled by fifteen percent.310 Under this scenario, Utah could generate $219 million in revenue
during 2017 from the targeted lands.311 This assumes that Utah receives fifty percent of production
royalties from existing wells, and all production royalties from wells drilled after transfer occurs.312
Revenues are projected to peak in 2022 at $250 million and fall thereafter.313 But, with Utah crude
projected to sell for half to two-thirds the modeled price, Utah has almost no chance to generate the
$469 million needed to break even.
With Utah’s ability to cover management costs linked to mineral development, one or more
of five factors must change for Utah to break even: Utah must increase mineral development much
faster than predicted; commodity prices must increase dramatically; Utah must increase production
royalty rates; Utah must capture more than fifty percent of the revenue from existing production; or
Utah must dramatically increase coal production. None of these scenarios appear likely.
First, increasing development by significantly more than fifteen percent annually appears

(on file with authors). Five dollars per barrel is a conservative estimate because the discount between January
2004 and July 2014 averaged $10.26/bbl, and averaged approximately $15 per barrel during the first half of
2014. Id.
310

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 7 at __.

311

Id. at xxviii. This scenario is not a management recommendation, but rather, one possible outcome. We

focus on this scenario because it represents what we believe to be the most likely scenario should the state
succeed in its efforts.
312

Id. at xxvii.

313

Id.
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unlikely, as low prices will drive production down rather than up. Indeed, drilling rig counts have
declined steadily, and precipitously, since December 2014, with just three drill rigs operating in Utah
during December of 2015.314 Second, commodity prices are not projected to increase, let alone at the
dramatic rate needed to make development profitable.315 Third, while Utah could conceivably
increase the royalty rate on new mineral leases, royalty rates for existing leases are set by contract
and cannot be changed unilaterally. Because it would take years for the state to begin generating
significant revenue from new leases, increasing royalty rates would produce minimal short-term
benefits. Fourth, the United States has historically retained mineral rights when conveying federal
public lands to the states in their statehood enabling acts, and to do otherwise now would reverse
longstanding precedent.316 Finally, Utah could increase coal production, possibly targeting deposits
within the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, but with Utah’s coal royalties averaging
less than $29 million annually,317 production would need to increase many times over to fill the
revenue gap. The ongoing transition from coal to natural gas for power production makes such an
increase unlikely. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine the American public embracing coal production
from within a National Monument.318
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For drill rig counts, see Baker Hughes, North American Rig Count, http://phx.corporate-

ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=79687&p=irol-reportsother.
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See SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 306.
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See section IV.A.4.
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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 9 at xxvii.
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It is also noteworthy that when the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument was created, the federal

government acquired all of Utah’s trust land located within the Monument’s borders. In return for the state
trust lands and other state inholdings within national forests, Indian reservations, and National Park Service
managed lands, Utah received title to federal public lands elsewhere within the state, substantial coal
resources, and $50 million dollars in cash. Pub. L. No. 105-225, 112 Stat. 3139, at § 2(15) (1998). Demanding
the return of lands that the state voluntarily conveyed away, and for which the state already received
compensation, hardly seems fair — unless the state intends to return the compensation it already received.
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While TPLA promise not to sell off acquired lands and note that under the TPLA the state
would receive only five percent of land sale proceeds,319 Utah may have little choice but to consider
mortgaging or selling land. As, the TPLA is not an agreement between the state and federal
government, Utah could unilaterally amend the TPLA and attempt to retain a greater share of sale
proceeds. Such an amendment and subsequent sales could create a sizeable new source of revenue,
and a strong incentive to sell transferred lands, especially if Utah faces a significant revenue shortfall.
These kinds of fiscal challenges are not unique to Utah. In timber-rich Idaho, the cost of
managing transferred public lands would exceed revenue under all but the most optimistic scenario.
According to a legislatively-commissioned report:
The total net cost to the State of Idaho for the [Idaho Department of Land] transfer
proposal would range from a loss of $111 million/year under the low-end scenario
to a loss of $60 million/year under the medium scenario to a gain of $24
million/year under the high-end scenario. Only under the high-end scenario . . .
would the state realize a gain after covering costs of wildfire, recreation, highway
maintenance and payments to counties.320
Furthermore, “it would take [Idaho] 10-15 years to ramp up to timber harvests on the transferred
lands to their full potential.”321 Wyoming reached the same conclusion when considering
management of the public domain: “Without significant changes to federal law, we would not
anticipate any substantial gains in revenue production or additional sources of revenue with any
transfer of management — certainly not enough to offset the enormous cost such an endeavor
would likely entail.”322
Given the need to rapidly increase revenue production, states would likely increase fees
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 63L-6-103(2) (2014).

320

Jay O’Laughlin, Univ. of Idaho C. of Nat. Res., Issue Brief: Would a Transfer of Federal Lands to the State of

Idaho Make or Lose Money? 5 (2014), at http://www.uidaho.edu/cnr/pag/publications/pag-issue-briefs.
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charged to all public land users. Montana is finalizing its selection of lands promised to the state
upon admission to the Union, a move that is anticipated to result in a “a 500 percent increase in
grazing fees for any ranchers who lease BLM lands that get transferred to the state.”323 This increase
is in line with the disparity in grazing fees found in other states. During 2016, the BLM charged
$2.11 per animal unit month (AUM)324 to graze livestock on federal land.325 By comparison,
Colorado’s grazing fees average $11.88 per AUM during 2014.326 Public land grazers, therefore,
should expect their grazing fees to increase if state takeover efforts succeed, as states would likely
increase revenue to create consistency with their ongoing grazing programs.
Skiers, snowboarders, and recreational cabin owners may fare similarly. Across the eleven
contiguous Western states, there are 120 ski resorts operating on national forest lands, including
iconic resorts like Vail and Sun Valley.327 The U.S. Forest Service also administers approximately

323

Brett French, State, BLM Negotiate Land Transfer to Settle 127-Year-Old Debt, BILLINGS GAZETTE (MT) (Oct.

20, 2016) (2016 WLNR 39052589). See also Laura Lundquist, The Other Land Transfer Effort, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS (Dec. 5, 2016) http://www.hcn.org/articles/states-receive-final-school-trust-lands-after-more-than-acentury?utm_source=WEBBER&utm_medium=mag (explaining in lieu selection and indicating that grazing
fees may rise by a factor of ten).
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§ 4100.0-5 (2015).
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Bureau of Land Mgmt., Dep’t. of the Interior, Instructional Memo. No. 2016-050, 2016 Grazing Fee,

Surcharge Rates, and Penalty for Unauthorized Grazing Use (March 2, 2016)
http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/regulations/Instruction_Memos_and_Bulletins/national_instruction/2
016/IM_2016-050.print.html. This represents a twenty-five percent increase over 2015 rates.
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Commissioners to State Land Board Lessees re: Changes to Standard Grazing Rates Effective April 1, 2014
(March 24, 2014), at
http://trustlands.state.co.us/NewsandMedia/Documents/AUM%20Equivalent%20Table%20and%202014
%20Grazing%20Rate%20Increase%20Letter.pdf.
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14,000 special use permits for recreational cabins and residences on forest lands.328 Presumably
states that acquire public lands would honor existing ski area and recreation residence permit terms.
The terms and conditions that states would impose upon new permits and permit renewal are
uncertain, but may need to increase if states find themselves strapped for cash. Fee increases could
directly impact resort operators, the millions of skiers and snowboarders who visit our national
forests every winter, and thousands of cabin users.
Royalties for oil and gas production occurring on formerly public land would also likely
increase. The USFS and BLM charge a 12.5-percent royalty on oil and natural gas production.329
Within the Intermountain West, states charge 16.67- to 25-percent production royalties.330 States
would likely impose these higher rates on new production from transferred lands. Mineral lease
renewals would also presumably prompt rate increases, bringing them into line with existing state
leases and market conditions.
Hard rock mineral claimants face similar uncertainty. Federal mining laws allow entities to
locate and stake a claim to certain minerals, and to develop those minerals without paying a
royalty.331 Claimants can retain rights to unpatented mineral claims indefinitely with only minimal

U.S.C. § 497b (2012) (National Forest Ski Area Permit Act).
328
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FOREST SERVICE RECREATION RESIDENCE 1 (2014)
http://www.fs.fed.us/eng/pubs/pdfpubs/pdf14232815/pdf14232815Pdpi100.pdf.
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43 C.F.R. § 3103.3-1(a)(1) (2015).
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(2013). See also CONG. BUDGET OFF., OPTIONS FOR INCREASING FEDERAL INCOME FROM OIL AND
NATURAL GAS ON FEDERAL LANDS 20 (2016) https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress2015-2016/reports/51421-oil_and_gas_options-2.pdf.
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financial outlays.332 These claims dot the West, including lands targeted by transfer proponents. It is
unclear how these rights would be impacted if public land is transferred to the states. States would
presumably seek to convert claims into leases in order to capture revenue and bring management in
line with programs regulating mining on state trust lands, which impose production royalties.333 How
states would proceed and the implications for existing right holders are unclear.
3.

Wildfire Cost and Policy

One cannot discuss public lands without addressing wildfires. Between 2002 and 2015 an
average of more than 3.6 million acres burned annually across the eleven contiguous Western states.
That average, however, belies tremendous annual variability. In 2004 just 854,772 acres burned
across that entire eleven state area, yet on twelve separate occasions over that same period, wildfires
in a single state consumed more than a million acres.
Within Utah, the USFS and the BLM annually spend an average of $24.4 million334 and $10.3
million335 respectively to suppress wildfires. These costs would presumably fall to Utah if public
lands are transferred to the state.336 And again, averages mask tremendous year-to-year variability in
acreage burned. Furthermore, both the total cost and cost per acre of fire suppression have
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30 U.S.C. § 28 (2012).

333

See e.g., UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 850-25-100 and -300 (2014) (requiring royalty payments on leased trust

lands). As of 1996, all of the eleven contiguous Western states surveyed imposed royalties on hard rock
mineral development occurring on state trust lands. Jon A. SOUDER & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, STATE TRUST
LANDS: HISTORY, MANAGEMENT, & SUSTAINABLE USE 226 (1996).
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Greg Zimmerman, Center for Western Priorities, The Wildfire Burden (2016)
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2012. STATE OF UTAH, BUDGET SUMMARY, FISCAL YEAR 2012, FISCAL YEAR 2011 SUPPLEMENTALS 118
(2011).
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increased steadily over the past 20 years.
In a normal year, wildfire suppression may be a manageable burden. In a severe fire year or
when the area at risk requires intensive and expensive suppression efforts (such as for fires near
homes or critical infrastructure), unpredicted costs could severely strain state resources. The risk of a
catastrophic wildfire cannot be overstated Across the eleven contiguous Western States, there are
over 1.9 million homes within the wildland-urban interface (WUI).337 Protection of private property
within the WUI accounts for the lion’s share of firefighting expenses,338 and would presumably
become a state responsibility.
The promise of “active management” does change these realities. Utah is not using
prescribed fire to reduce catastrophic fire risks on state lands, and there is no reason to believe that
would change if it took over public lands. Between 2002 and 2013, prescribed fire accounted for
only one percent of state lands consumed by fire; by comparison prescribed fire accounted for over
twenty-seven percent of the USFS lands burned within Utah.339
“Salvaging” timber that has succumbed to mountain pine beetle does not offer a solution for
most states as costs far more than the timber can be sold for. In Utah, for example, salvage sale
costs average $719 per acre but produce just $8 per acre in revenue.340 Arizona, Colorado, Nevada,
New Mexico, and Wyoming all fare similarly, with sale costs exceeding proceeds.341
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While transfer theory is grounded in a sincere belief that states would be better managers,
the evidence simply does not support these claims. Asking the public to trust in states to do better in
the absence of clear evidence of either plans or capacities is foolish.
4.

Federal Mineral Reservations

Even if states succeed in establishing a duty to dispose of public lands, that duty is unlikely
to extend to mineral lands. Absent mineral lands, states will have a very hard time covering
anticipated management expenses.
The 1889 act authorizing Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington state to
join the Union provides that “all mineral lands shall be exempt from the grants made by this act.”342
Similar provisions apply to Colorado,343 Idaho,344 Wyoming,345 New Mexico,346 and Arizona.347
Enabling acts for California, Oregon, and Utah did not include an explicit federal mineral
reservation, but the U.S. Supreme Court long ago dispelled any notion that Congress intended to
convey mineral lands to these states.
Ivanhoe Mining v. Keystone Consol. Mining Co. involved a dispute over ownership of a mining
claim, with Keystone claiming that they received title to the land from the United States, while
Ivanhoe claimed title from the state. The state’s claim of title derived from California’s statehood
enabling act, which granted the state the right to title to certain enumerated lands. Despite the lack
of an express mineral reservation in the enabling act, the Supreme Court held that “[m]ineral lands
are, by the settled policy of the government, excluded from all grants; therefore the grant . . . of

342

Montana and Washington Enabling Act, 25 Stat 676, 681 (1889).
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Colorado Enabling Act, 18 Stat. 474, 476 (1875), as amended Apr. 2, 1884, c. 20, 23 Stat. 10.
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Idaho Enabling Act, 26 Stat. 215, 217 (1890).

345

Wyoming Enabling Act, 26 Stat. 222, 224 (1890).

346

New Mexico and Arizona Enabling Act, 36 Stat. 557, 561 (1910).

347

Id. at 572.
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public lands to the state of California for school purposes, was not intended to cover mineral
lands.”348 The High Court reached the same conclusion in a case originating in Utah,349 and it’s
holdings are consistent with administrative practice contemporaneous with Utah’s admission to the
Union.350
It is also noteworthy that the express reservation contained in the Montana, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Washington state, Colorado Idaho, Wyoming, New Mexico, and Arizona enabling
acts all apply to “all mineral lands” without regard to the means of conveyance. To grant Utah lands
that were expressly excluded from grants to her sister states would give Utah a unique advantage
that is at odds with Utah’s insistence that must be placed on an equal footing with other states.
Legal barriers aside, it is worth considering the questions that would arise if the Supreme
Court sets aside more than a century of settled law. The Supreme Court has interpreted the term
“mineral,” which is not defined in statehood enabling acts, quite broadly. “[M]ineral lands include
not merely metalliferous lands, but all such as are chiefly valuable for their deposits of a mineral
character, which are useful in the arts or valuable for purposes of manufacture.”351 Once “minerals”
are defined, the question becomes whether minerals are of sufficient quantity and quality to justify

348

Ivanhoe Mining Co. v. Keystone Consol. Mining Co., 102 U.S. 167, 174-75 (1880).

349

U.S. v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563 (1919).

350

In 1898, the General Land Office (GLO, the precursor agency to the BLM) recognized an implied

reservation of minerals in section eight of the Utah Enabling Act precluding grants of mineral lands for
universities. Ricther v. Utah, 27 Pub. Lands Dec. 95 (1898). One year later the GLO recognized an implied
reservation of minerals in section seven of the act, precluding grants of coal and mineral lands as part of the
grant supporting construction of the state capitol. State of Utah, 29 Pub. Lands Dec. 69 (1899). Four years
later, the GLO observed that “[i]t is settled law that a grant of school lands to a State [under section six of the
act] does not carry lands known to be chiefly valuable for mineral at the time when the State’s right would
attach, if at all.” State of Utah, 32 Pub. Lands Dec. 117 (1903), see also, Mahoganey No. 2 Lode Claim, 33 Pub.
Land Dec. 37 (1904).
351

Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 536-37 (1903).
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classifying the lands as “mineral in character.” The reservations of mineral lands, “are not held to
exclude all lands in which minerals may be found, but only those where the mineral is in sufficient
quantity to add to their richness, and to justify expenditure for its extraction.”352 A leading treatise
on mining law in effect at the time of the Utah’s admission to the Union summarizes the rules for
determining the mineral character of land:
The mineral character of the land is established when it is shown to have upon or
within it such a substance as — (a) Is recognized as mineral, according to its
chemical composition, by the standard authorities on the subject; or (b) Is classified
as a mineral product in trade or commerce; or (c) Such a substance (other than the
mere surface which may be used for agricultural purposes) as possesses economic
value for use in trade, manufacture, the sciences, or in the mechanical or ornamental
arts.353
In sum, the existence and extent of the federal reservation depends on both the nature and
quantum of the mineral resource, and whether the value of those resources outweighs the value of
the land for agricultural purposes.354 These are highly fact intensive and site-specific questions that
the California Supreme Court summarized nicely 151 years ago when it said:
It is not easy in all cases to determine whether any given piece of land should be
classed as mineral lands or otherwise. The question may depend upon many
circumstances such as whether it is located in those regions generally recognized as
mineral lands, or in a locality ordinarily regarded as agricultural in its character. Lands
may contain the precious metals, but not in sufficient quantities to justify working
them as mines, or make the locality generally valuable for mining purposes, while
they are well adapted to agricultural or grazing pursuits; or they may be but poorly
adapted to agricultural purposes, but rich in minerals; and there may be every
gradation between the two extremes. There is, however, no certain, well defined,
obvious boundary between the mineral lands and those that cannot be classed in that
category. Perhaps the true criterion would be to consider whether upon the whole
the lands appear to be better adapted to mining or other purposes. However that
may be, in order to determine the question, it would, at all events, be necessary to
know the condition and circumstances of the land itself, and of the immediate

352

Davis v. Wiebbold, 139 U.S. 507, 519 (1891); Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U.S. 392, 404 (1885).

353

LINDLEY, supra note 132 at § 98.

354

Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 233 US at 239-40.
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locality in which it is situated.355
Knowledge of coal, oil, and natural gas formations has been largely established, but
knowledge of other minerals may be less well defined.356 Where mineral resources are known to exist
but development has yet to occur, the question of whether the lands are indeed mineral in character
will need resolution. That means that any state claim to potential mineral lands will necessitate
extensive fact finding and litigation for each parcel claimed by the state. Such litigation would take
decades to sort out.
B.

Unintended Consequences

As we have seen, establishing a duty to dispose of the public domain would open a
Pandora’s Box of fact-intensive litigation. If transfer advocates succeed, Endangered Species Act
(ESA)357 compliance would also become more complicated, access to what were previously public
lands would be diminished as economic imperatives force states to increase revenue generation, and
opportunities for the public to engage on the future management of our public lands would decline.
1.

ESA Compliance358

Transferring land out of federal ownership will increase ESA compliance costs and shift the
burden of ESA compliance to non-federal landowners. Increasing compliance costs could

355

Ah Yew v. Choate, 24 Cal. 562, 567-68 (1864).

356

With respect to coal and oil bearing lands, mineral classification may be based on facts creating a

reasonable belief that the lands contain minerals, which can be established by inference from nearby geologic
features. Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. U.S., 233 U.S. 236, 249 (1914) (inferring knowledge of coal from
proximate geology and development activity). See also, 1 - ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. FOUND., AMERICAN
LAW OF MINING, 2D ED. § [12.02[4]] (LEXISNEXIS MATTHEW BENDER 2015).
357

16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1543 (2012).

358

The discussion on ESA compliance draws heavily from Ruple et al., Shooting the Albatross: Why a State

Takeover of Federal Public Lands Would Make Endangered Species Act Compliance More Difficult, 39 ENVIRONS
ENVTL. L. & POLICY J. 115 (2016).
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discourage development — precisely what transfer backers are trying to avoid.
The ESA prohibits the “take” of listed animals, except when the take is authorized in a
federal permit.359 “Take” includes “harm,” which is any act that actually kills or injures wildlife,
including habitat modifications that significantly impair feeding or sheltering.360 An unauthorized
take is punishable by imprisonment for up to one year, fines of up to $50,000 per violation, or
both.361 One avoids ESA liability by complying with the Act’s procedural requirements.
Actions on federal land, requiring federal authorization, or receiving federal funding require
federal agencies to consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)362 to “insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of [designated critical] habitat.”363 If the proposed action is likely to adversely affect a
listed species or its critical habitat, then the agency must submit a biological assessment to the
FWS.364 The assessment “evaluate[s] the potential effects of the action” on listed species and that
species’ critical habitat.365 After reviewing the assessment, the FWS prepares and issues a biological
opinion addressing whether the proposed action is likely to jeopardize any listed species, and if so,

359

16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012). Section nine of the ESA provides lesser protections for listed plants. Id.

at §1538(a)(2).
360

50 C.F.R. § 222.102 (2015).

361

See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1540(b) (2012) (criminal penalties), and 1540(a) (civil penalties).

362

The FWS administers the ESA with respect to terrestrial plant and animal species; NOAA Fisheries

administers the ESA with respect to marine and anadromous species. This article discusses only the FWS
because, as it focuses on activities in the Intermountain West.
363

15 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).

364

50 C.F.R. § 402.14(c) (2015).

365

50 C.F.R. § 402.12(a) (2015).
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whether “reasonable and prudent alternatives” exist to avoid jeopardy.366
If the biological opinion concludes that jeopardy is unlikely and that there will not be an
adverse modification of critical habitat, the FWS issues an incidental take statement (ITS).367 ITS
compliance shields its holder and their agents from liability for the inadvertent taking of an ESAlisted species.368 Conversely, deviation from ITS terms and conditions may result in ITS revocation,
or loss of the liability shield.369 Agencies must reinitiate consultation on an ITS if the proposed
action is “modified in a manner that causes an effect to the listed species or critical habitat that was
not considered in the biological opinion.”370 When reinitiation of consultation is required, the
biological opinion loses its validity, and the ITS no longer shields the agency from taking liability.371
Actions lacking a federal nexus are still subject to the prohibition against harming a listed
species, though the path to liability protection for an inadvertent take changes. Under section ten of
the ESA, an incidental take permit (ITP) is available to parties undertaking otherwise lawful projects
that lack a federal nexus and that might result in the unintended take of a listed species. To apply for
an ITP, the proponent must prepare a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP).372
ITP issuance is a federal action independent of the activity necessitating HCP development.
The FWS must therefore comply with section seven and consult with itself on the impact of HCP
issuance before granting the HCP. The FWS must also comply with NEPA independent of the

366

16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2012).

367

16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2012). Incidental take is a take that results from, but is not for the purpose of,

carrying out an otherwise lawful activity. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2015).
368

16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(iv) (2012).

369

See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (2015); Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229,

1239 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a “take” under ITS noncompliance may result in civil and criminal liability).
370

50 C.F.R. § 402.16(c) (2015).

371

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgt., 698 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012).

372

HCP requirements are set forth at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1539(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iv) and 1539(a)(2)(B)(i)-(v) (2012).
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analysis completed in association with the project for which the HCP was originally developed.373
Transferring public land from the federal government would eliminate the federal nexus,
nullify existing section seven consultations, and invalidate associated ITSs.374 All activities on what
were formerly federal lands that could “take” an ESA-listed species and which were formerly
covered by an ITS, would need an HCP and ITP. Until both are approved, proponents could be
liable for any inadvertent “take” their activities might cause.
The impact of developing HCPs to replace existing ITSs could be significant. In Utah, loss
of a federal nexus could impact 3,240 wells that are currently producing oil or natural gas from areas
known to contain a threatened or endangered species — 2,155 of these wells are on federal land
targeted for transfer under the TPLA.375 As of November 10, 2015, there were also 972 active
service wells (primarily disposal wells and wells used for secondary production) on federal lands
containing a threatened or endangered species,376 all of which would need to revisit ESA compliance.
There were also 1,103 wells in Utah in areas with known ESA species occurrences that were
approved but where drilling had not commenced, plus an additional 36 pending Applications for a
Permits to Drill in areas with known ESA species occurrences. For these and other future wells,
operators and landowners would also need an HCP.
Wells on non-federal land could also be impacted. When the FWS consults on a project
involving mixed federal and non-federal land it considers the entire action area, not just federally

373

42 U.S.C. 4321-4370a (2012), see Christopher H.M. Carter, A Dual Track for Incidental Takings: Reexamining

Sections 7 and 10 of the Endangered Species Act, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 135, 161 (1991) (“By sanctioning [a
HCP], the Secretary allows other parties to take actions that could significantly affect the quality of the
environment.”).
374

Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229, 1239 (9th Cir. 2001).

375

Ruple et al., supra note 358 at __.

376

Id. at __.
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owned land.377 Eliminating the federal nexus created by federal ownership could therefore invalidate
ITS protection for oil and gas development on intermixed state, tribal, or privately owned land.
Notably, HCP permitting often takes two to three times longer to complete than section
seven consultation, and HCP preparation can be quite expensive.378 If public lands are transferred
out of federal control, the ESA compliance burden will increase, possibly impeding the economic
development that transfer advocates seek.
2.

Public Access

A management mandate emphasizing revenue generation, whether driven by ideology or
fiscal necessity, would displace other users and increase access costs. Access to state trust land
already involves substantial hidden costs, foreshadowing costs that are likely to arise if the
transferred lands are managed with an eye towards revenue generation. The New Mexico Game
Commission recently agreed to pay the New Mexico Land Office $1 million for a one-year easement
allowing hunters, anglers, and trapping access to state trust lands.379 Non-wildlife related access to
New Mexico’s state trust lands requires a $25 annual recreational access permit for each hiker or
recreator.380 During 2016, the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources paid $775,664 to SITLA “for
public access to school and institutional trust lands for hunting, fishing, trapping, and viewing of
wildlife.”381 Such recreation user fees are common throughout the West.382

377

50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(1) (2015).

378

Ruple et al., supra note 358 at __.

379

State of New Mexico, Comm’r of Public Lands, State Game Commission Easement 3 (Nov. 2015) (on file

with author).
380

New Mexico State Land Office, Recreational Access,

http://www.nmstatelands.org/Recreational_Access.aspx#RecreationalPermit.
381

Memorandum of Agreement between the Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration and

the Utah Department of Natural Resources, Division of Wildlife Resources 1 (2007) (on file with author).
382

State trust land managers in Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas all either
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Across the eleven contiguous Western States, over 27.5 million people visited developed
recreation sites on BLM lands during 2014, and an additional 30.0 million engaged in dispersed
recreation on BLM lands. See Table 3. Between 2008 and 2012, annual National Forest visitation in
Utah, Nevada, southern Idaho, and southwestern Wyoming (USFS Region 4) averaged over 20.8
million, with over ninety-five percent of those visits occurring outside of congressionally designated
Wilderness areas.383 Upwards of seventy-five percent of hunters utilize public lands in Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.384 Emphasizing commodity production and revenue
generation or increased application of access fees may impact these users.
State
Arizona
California
Colorado
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
Oregon
Utah
Washington
Wyoming
Total

Recreation Site
Visits
2,260
3,966
3,442
2,671
1,689
3,642
1,169
3,662
3,469
-1,557
27,527

Dispersed
Recreation Visits
1,097
4,020
3,434
3,359
3,337
3,534
2,215
4,309
3,401
-1,316
30,022

Anglers

Hunters

637
1,674
767
447
267
147
278
638
414
938
303
6,510

269
394
259
246
150
43
69
196
193
219
140
2,178

Wildlife
Viewers
1,566
6,733
1,782
558
402
643
566
1,440
717
2,168
518
17,093

Table 3 -- Recreation on BLM Lands (FY 2014) 385
(in thousands)
limited access or required some form of payment to hunt, fish, or camp on state trust lands. SOUDER &
FAIRFAX, supra note 333 at 271-73. Arizona, Washington, Louisiana, and Minnesota also impose recreation
user fees. Western Lands and Communities, at http://statetrustlands.org/current-issues/recreationaluses.html.
383

U.S. FOREST SERV., DEP’T. OF AGRIC., NATIONAL VISITOR USE MONITORING RESULTS USDA FOREST

SERVICE NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT Table 2 (2013),
http://www.fs.fed.us/recreation/programs/nvum/2012%20National_Summary_Report_061413.pdf.
384

Backcountry Hunters Anglers, Our Public Lands Not for Sale 6 (2014), at

http://www.backcountryhunters.org/images/Public_Lands_Report.pdf.
385

BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 2014 187, 195 (2015).
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Two examples from Utah foreshadow potential impacts on public access. In 2013, SITLA
announced an agreement to lease 96,000 acres of trust land in the Book Cliff Mountains. The lessee,
Anadarko Petroleum, would develop oil and natural gas from the tract, generating millions of dollars
for trust beneficiaries.386 The development area, however, is home to prized mule deer and elk
populations, and the site of an aggressive effort to recover Bonneville cutthroat trout.387 Utah’s
Governor, members of Utah’s congressional delegation, and a host of sportsmens’ organizations —
none of whom had an opportunity to provide input on the transaction — all opposed the lease.388
The SITLA Board, however, voted unanimously to proceed with the lease.389
Similarly, in 2005, SITLA offered to lease 356-acres of land near “Little Hole,” along the
Green River. The parcel was put up for auction after a developer proposed to build a lodge at the
site. Little Hole is a key recreation access point to this blue-ribbon trout stream, and also provides
important winter habitat for deer and elk. Trout Unlimited, the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation,
and the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources all opposed the sale.390 Despite these objections, SITLA

386

Amy Joi O’Donoghue, Is Oil Lease a Choice Between Schoolchildren and Hunters? DESERET NEWS Aug. 27,

2013, at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865585338/Gov-Gary-Herbert-says-SITLA-decision-onBook-Cliffs-lease-should-be-reconsidered.html?
387

The states of Utah and Nevada both have in place conservation agreements for the Bonneville Cutthroat

Trout that were significant factors in the FWS’s decision not to list the trout as either endangered or
threatened under the ESA. See Fish and Wildlife Service, Dep’t. of the Interior, 12-Month Finding on a
Petition to List the Bonneville Cutthroat Trout as Threatened or Endangered, 73 FED. REG. 52,235, 52,247
(Sept. 9, 2008).
388

Amy Joi O’Donoghue, State School Board Votes in Favor of Oil and Gas Lease, DESERET NEWS Sept. 6, 2013,

at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865585960/State-School-Board-votes-in-favor-of-oil-and-gaslease.html?
389

Id.

390

Lezlee E. Whiting & Dustin Gardiner, Plan Angers Anglers, DESERET MORNING NEWS, July 5, 2006, 2006

WLNR 11556120.
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auctioned off the property, forcing the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources to pay $1.4 million to
purchase the parcel, maintain public access, and prevent development.391 State trust land
development poses a similar risk to Grand Teton National Park, where Wyoming threatens to sell
off inholdings within the Park unless the federal government purchases the land from the state.392
While these transactions exemplify efficient revenue generation, they also show that other
values suffer when market efficiency is elevated above multiple-use management. If states take over
land management, fiscal realities will force more development. When this happens, hunting, fishing,
camping, and recreational access will all likely suffer.
3.

Public Input

Federal law guarantees an opportunity for public input on resource management decisions
involving our public lands. State laws generally do not provide comparable opportunities to provide
input on land management decisions. A public land transfer, therefore, could leave the public with a
diminished voice on management of the targeted lands.
Under federal law, the BLM and USFS must inventory public lands and the resources the
lands contain.393 The agencies must then develop and update resource management plans for those
lands, establishing management priorities and direction.394 The planning process incorporates
NEPA, under which federal agencies must consider and document the impacts of various land
management scenarios.395 Under NEPA, federal agencies must also solicit and consider public

391

Ben Caballero, Wildlife Division Buys 356 Acres of Trust Land, DESERET MORNING News, May 12, 2007,

2007 WLNR 9007881.
392

Mead Gruver, Reappraisal in Works for Pricey Grand Teton Tracts, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE JULY 10, 2014. See

also, Mead Gruver, Groups Back Legislation to Help Grand Teton Deal, Nov. 15, 2011 AP ALERT - WY 23:15:39.
393

43 U.S.C. § 1711 (2012) (BLM); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601 and 1603 (2012) (USFS).

394

43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012) (BLM); 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012) (USFS).

395

42 U.S.C. § 102(2)(c) (2012).
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input.396 Of the eleven Western states, only California, Montana, and Washington have state
environmental policy acts.397 Although states will presumably not allow agencies to act without any
public notice or input, there is currently no guaranteed voice for the interested public.398
C.

The Hollow Sound of Victory

Assuming, solely for argument’s sake, that TPLA backers succeed in establishing a federal
obligation to dispose of significant additional portions of the public domain, we would then need to
determine which lands would be disposed of, how lands would be disposed of, and a host of other
thorny substantive and procedural questions.
1.

Surveying the Public Domain and the Minerals they Contain

Land cannot be conveyed out of federal ownership until it is surveyed and a mineral
character determination has been completed. Both steps would likely take years to complete. The
public land survey system divides the landscape into townships, each of which contains thirty-six
sections. Each section is normally one square-mile in size (640 acres).399 The Arizona, New Mexico,
and Utah enabling acts grant the states four sections in every township within the state.400 See Figure
3. Enabling acts for other western states contain similar provisions, but grant states two sections in

396

40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1503.1, and 1503.4 (2015).

397

Council on Envtl Quality, State NEPA Contacts (2013), at

http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/09/f2/States_NEPA_Like_22June2013.pdf.
398

In 2016 the Utah legislature enacted the Public Land Planning and Management Act, which calls for

management plan development and public involvement. The Act, however, does not contain specific public
notice or involvement requirements. There are therefore no substantive guarantees that Utahns, let alone
citizens of other states, will have a meaningful voice in management of transferred lands. H.B. 276, 2016 Gen.
Sess. (Utah 2016) (to be codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-8-101 through -602 and 79-6-101 through 105).
399

See 43 U.S.C. § 751 (2012).

400

Arizona and New Mexico Enabling Act, 36 Stat. 557, 561 (1910); Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107, 109

(1894).
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each township.401 Where these “in place” grants were subject to prior sales, grants, or reservations,
states have the right to select “in-lieu” lands. States also received “quantity grants,” which included a
specified number of acres that the state could select from the surveyed public domain.402

Figure 1 -- Public Land Survey and Land Grants
Conveyance of these lands to the states required completion of public land surveys because
the boundary of lands to be conveyed could not be marked on the ground or defined with adequate
legal precision until surveys were finalized.403 Where surveys were completed prior to states joining

401

See GATES, supra note 76 at app. C (summarizing the grants made to each state upon admission to the

Union).
402

See e.g., Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat, 107, 109-10 (1894).

403

GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, 2 PUB. NAT. RESOURCES L. § 13:51 (2nd ed.)

(“Precise boundaries are necessary for secure land titles.”).
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the Union, the effective date of the grants coincides with statehood.404 Where statehood preceded
surveys, as was the case in much of the West, lands remain in federal ownership until surveys are
completed.405 The Court went on to express its reluctance at upsetting this well-established rule,
noting that many prior decisions rest on its application, and that a departure could produce unequal
outcomes among the several states.406
Despite ongoing efforts to survey the West,407 millions of acres of the public domain have
never been surveyed. In Nevada, for example, approximately thirty-percent of the state remains
unsurveyed.408 Maps depicting the condition of surveys in Utah were completed during 2008-09, and
indicate that roughly one-third of the state has not been surveyed.409 Many existing surveys are also
quite old and may need to be updated before a conveyance could occur.
Furthermore, as we have already seen, the federal government had a longstanding policy of

404

United States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1947).

405

Id. at 443-44; see also Heydenfeldt v. Daney, Gold & Silver Mining Co., 93 U.S. 634 (1877) (interpreting

Nevada Enabling Act), and Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1980) (internal citations omitted)
(“Whether the Enabling Act contained words of present or future grant, title to the numbered sections did
not vest in the State until completion of an official survey. Prior to survey, the Federal Government remained
free to dispose of the designated lands in any manner and for any purpose consistent with applicable federal
statutes.”).
406

United States v Wyoming, 331 U.S. at 454 (internal citations omitted).

407

During FY 2015, the Department of the Interior completed original surveys of 2,157,820 acres and

resurveyed 485,796 acres. Almost all of the newly surveyed acres were in Alaska. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS
2015 supra note 126 at 24.
408

“In Nevada, the GLO/Cadastral surveys were initiated in 1861. Current survey conditions in Nevada have

approximately 40% of Nevada townships surveyed prior to 1910 and monumented with stone or wooden
posts at the corner points. Another 30% are [sic] surveyed after 1910 utilizing metal post and brass cap
monuments at the corner points. The remaining 30% is unsurveyed land.”
http://www.blm.gov/nv/st/en/prog/more_programs/geographic_sciences/cadastral.html.
409

Estimates are based on fifteen Geographic Coordinate Database Section Status (GCDB) maps prepared by

the Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (on file with author).
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reserving lands that were known to be mineral in character before transferring lands out of the
public domain.410 Geological survey maps have not traditionally been considered in determining the
mineral or non-mineral character of the public domain.411 A more critical eye was required because
surveyors were generally not qualified as geologists, nor were they charged with reviewing the lands
within the interior of surveyed areas. Accordingly, the mineral or non-mineral character of the land
has “always been a question of fact, to be determined, generally speaking, by the land department,
on hearings ordered for that purpose.”412 Today:
In making mineral character determinations the Department of the Interior acts as a
special tribunal with judicial functions. Once the Secretary issues a patent, certifies a
list, or makes a survey . . . the findings of fact that precede the issuance of the patent
or other instrument are conclusive upon the Department and the courts. Although
questions of law are reviewable by the courts, they are not subject to reexamination
by the Department.413
As the mineral or non-mineral character of the lands at issue must be determined before a
court can determine whether a particular parcel of land would be subject to transfer, the Department
of the Interior would need to complete an unprecedented number of adjudicatory decisions, as well
as the factual investigations each adjudication requires. Those proceedings would likely cause
decades of delay before any transfers could occur.414

410

See supra, section IV.A.4.

411

LINDLEY, supra note 132 at 118. While the federal surveyor general was required to note mineral features

encountered during public land surveys, these notations serve as prima facie evidence of mineral or nonmineral character but are not dispositive. Id. at 118-20.
412

Id. at 123.

413

AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, supra note 356 at § 12.02[1].

414

Faced with a near impossible task of investigating every section of land subject to grant or state selection,

as well as a growing number of cases challenging the validity of prior grants, Congress passed the Jones Act.
44 Stat. 1026 (1927) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 870-71 (2012)). The Jones Act released to the states
grants of numbered school sections that had been previously withheld because of mineral classification. The
Act, however, applies only to in-place numbered section grants supporting public schools. The TPLA does
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Understanding the Roots of Frustration and Exploring Alternatives to Land
Transfers
The number of transfer bills taken up by state legislators and the proliferation of self-help

remedies to perceived mismanagement of the public domain attest to the depth of frustration some
feel. If we are to find a tenable path out of the cycle of sagebrush rebelliousness we must understand
and address the roots of frustration. At their most basic, the frustrations come down to the
challenge of striking an acceptable balance in managing our public lands. As one prominent scholar
explains, “[b]iological sciences cannot tell us how much Wilderness is enough, and economists
cannot calculate whether the money spent to save bald eagles was worth it.”415 Accordingly,
“decisions regarding multiple use policy are policy decisions and they will continue to be driven by
politics no matter who manages those lands.”416 This section reviews several of the factors involved
in striking that balance, and then turns to possible means of addressing those problems.
A.

Policy and Demographic Evolution — And the Challenges They Wrought

Between 1976 and 2013, the population of the eleven contiguous Western states grew at
more than twice the pace of the rest of the country, swelling form 38.1 million to 72.1 million.417
The three fastest growing states over that period were Nevada, Arizona, and Utah, and their growth
dramatically impacts the landscape. Between 2001 and 2011, more than 2 million acres of natural
areas in the West were lost to human development, with Wyoming and Utah experiencing the largest

not contend that the federal government breached its obligation to dispose of enumerated in-place school
sections. Rather, the TPLA contends that the federal government failed to dispose of sections other than
those specifically identified in statehood enabling acts. The Jones Act, therefore, does not apply to TPLA
claims.
415

George Cameron Coggins, ‘Devolution’ in Federal Land Law: Abdication by any Other Name. . . , 14 HASTINGS

WEST-NORTHWEST J. ENVTL. L & POLICY 485, 489 (2008).
416

Y2 Consulting, Study of Management of Public Lands in Wyoming v (2016).

417

Population data obtained from multiple Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep’t of Comm. sources.
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percentage change in area modified by human development.418 Management policies and priorities
necessarily evolved to reflect both changing demographic realities and social priorities. Communities
sometimes struggle to adapt to these changes, and understanding evolutionary change can help us
understand the discontent we face today.
Changes occurred on multiple fronts. Prior to 1934 and enactment of the Taylor Grazing
Act, the federal government made little effort to manage livestock grazing on the public domain.
The Taylor Grazing Act marked a profound change in public land management philosophy, creating
grazing districts which included portions of the public domain deemed “chiefly valuable for grazing
and raising forage crops.”419 Proposed grazing districts were withdrawn from all forms of entry of
settlement.420
The Wilderness Act of 1964421 set aside large tracts of public land as free from development.
Today, Wilderness areas overlay more than 109 million acres mostly in the West.422 While many see
the Wilderness Act as protecting irreplaceable natural landscapes, some in timber- or mineraldependent communities see access to prosperity-sustaining commodities foregone.
The Endangered Species Act of 1973423 requires all federal agencies to conserve endangered
species and threatened species,424 prohibiting actions that harm a listed species or its habitat.425
Efforts to protect endangered species have placed lands containing valuable commodities out of

418

Ctr. for American Progress, The Disappearing West https://disappearingwest.org (last visited May 17,

2016).
419

43 U.S.C. § 315 (2012).

420

43 U.S.C. § 315 (2012).

421

16 U.S.C. § 1131-26 (2012).

422

See www.wilderness.net/NWPS/factsheep.cfm.

423

16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2012).

424

16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1) (2012).

425

16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2012), 50 C.F.R. § 222.102 (2015).
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reach to developers, often to the consternation of those who see jobs lost and tax revenue foregone.
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA)426 repealed a host of
statutes allowing for the disposal of federal public lands,427 replacing those statutes with a
commitment to retaining most public lands in federal ownership.428 FLPMA also recognized
numerousnon-commodity values, pivoting the BLM towards multiple-use, sustained0-yield
management.429
The National Forest Management Act (NFMA)430 and the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act
of 1960431 broadened the Forest Service’s mandate, requiring management for “outdoor recreation,
range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish,”432 and “judicious use of the land . . . and
harmonious and coordinated management of the various resources.”433
Balancing competing public lands uses often trigger NEPA, and can require evaluation in an
environmental impact statement.434 While NEPA provides valuable opportunities for public
involvement,435 it also increases the time and expense involved obtaining agency approvals, and
decisions may need to be revisited in light of new information and changed conditions,436 injecting

426

43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (2012).

427

43 U.S.C. § 161-254 (____) (repealed 1976).

428

43 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2012).

429

43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (2012).

430

16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (2012).

431

16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012).

432

16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012).

433

16 U.S.C. § 531(a) (2012).

434

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). A less intensive environmental assessment may be required if it is unclear

whether the impacts are significant. 43 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (2015).
435

See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1502.19, 1503.1—1503.4, and 1506.6 (2015).

436

See e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c) (2015) (requiring supplemental NEPA analysis where agency actions change

or new information becomes available).
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an additional level of uncertainty into development planning. Striking the balance required under
these and other laws is a daunting task that can engender frustration with public land managers.
B.

Evolutionary Pain & Western Discontent

Not all communities have anticipated or adapted to evolving conditions or management
requirements. Some see management changes as an attack on the Western way of life and the
communities that developed in reliance on public lands.437 The pain many feel is real, as is their
interest in engaging in the management of lands that are close to their livelihoods.438 This section
introduces several examples of the frustrations that undergird transfer efforts, and that must be
overcome by any successful effort to address the true causes of frustration.
1.

Fragmented Landscape; Divergent Objectives

“[Today, t]he land ownership map of the West in many places resembles a crazy quilt,
without reason or coherent pattern . . . [and] fragmented ownership patterns generate a plethora of
disputes over access and similar problems.”439 Upon admission to the Union, states received the
right to title to specified sections of land. Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, for example, each
received the right to title to four non-contiguous sections in every township.440 See Figure 3. These

437

See e.g., BRIAN ALLEN DRAKE, LOVING NATURE, FEARING THE STATE: ENVIRONMENTALISM AND

ANTIGOVERNMENT POLITICS BEFORE REAGAN (2013) (discussing early federal-state tensions over public
land management); R. MCGREGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND WESTERN ANGER: THE SAGEBRUSH
REBELLION & ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (1993) (discussing the “Sagebrush Rebellion”); and James R.
SKILLEN, THE NATION’S LARGEST LANDLORD: THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAN
WEST (2009) (discussing “neosagebrush politics”).
438

See Charles F. Wilkinson, Cross-Jurisdictional Conflicts: An Analysis of Legitimate State Interests on Federal and

Indian Lands, 2 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 145 (1982) (addressing the legitimacy of state interests and the
disconnect between those interests and state actions).
439

GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKMAN, 1 PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW, § 2:9 (2d

ed. 2010, Feb 2016 update).
440

28 Stat. 107, 109 (1894).
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grants extended across a state, providing nascent state governments with a representative sample of
marketable natural resources, and creating an incentive to develop all parts of the state.441
Lands were granted to states in order to generate revenue in support of public schools and
institutions, and are managed by the states as part of a trust to support those beneficiaries.442 Across
the eleven contiguous Western states, state trust lands administrators today manage 40.4 million
acres of surface estate.443 In Utah, for example, SITLA manages 3.3 million acres — a land area
larger than Connecticut,444 but scattered across the landscape in over 9,000 individual parcels. The
challenges inherent in managing a fragmented landscape come into focus when we consider
competing management objectives.445
SITLA, like other states’ trust lands administrators, must manage lands in the most “prudent
and profitable manner possible” to support public schools and institutions.446 Specifically, SITLA
must “obtain the optimum values from use of trust lands and revenues for the trust beneficiaries,
including the return of not less than fair market value for the use, sale, or exchange of school and

441

Additionally, states received the right to select hundreds of thousands of additional acres from across the

unreserved lands within the state. These grants are often referred to as “quantity grants,” because the quantity
of land granted to the states was set forth by statute.
442

SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 333.

443

Headwaters Econ., supra note 226.

444

The land area of Connecticut is 4,840 square-miles or 3,097,600 acres. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEP’T OF

COMM., 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Table 358. Land and Water Area of States
and Other Entities: 2008 available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/.
445

Fairfax argues persuasively that public land fragmentation is more of a challenge for the BLM than for

other federal land managers, and the need to cooperate with other land owners makes the BLM weaker than
other agencies that are both better funded and able to act with greater independence. Sally Fairfax, Old Recipes
for New Federalism, 12 ENVTL. L. 945, 975 (1982).
446

UTAH CODE ANN. § 53C-1-102(2)(b) (2014); see also SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 333, chs. 1&2

(discussing mandate as applied across the West).
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institutional trust assets.”447 “[T]rust beneficiaries do not include the general public or other
governmental institutions, and the trust is not to be administered for the general welfare of the
state.”448
Most state trust lands remain in individual 640 acre parcels that are surrounded by federal
lands. The BLM is directed to “prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands,”449 and the
USFS must insure that timber harvests do not unnecessarily impair other sensitive resources.450 Both
agencies manage large tracts of congressionally designated Wilderness, and the BLM manages
Wilderness Study Areas (WSAs) to prevent impairment to wilderness values until Congress acts on
pending Wilderness proposals.451 Across the West, Wilderness and WSAs cover over 48 million
acres. Other parts of the federal landscape, such as National Parks and Wildlife Refuges are also
managed for conservation objectives.452 The intertwining of lands that are managed by different
entities and for cross purposes invites conflict.453
State trust land inholdings are also found in BLM managed National Monuments and
National Conservation Areas in Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, and New Mexico,454 as
well as in BLM managed National Conservation Areas in Arizona and Idaho.455 While inholdings

447

UTAH CODE ANN. § 53C-1-302(1)(b)(iii) (2014).

448

Utah Code Ann. § 53C-1-102(2)(d) (2014), Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d

909, 919 (Utah 1994).
449

43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012).

450

16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E) (2012).

451

43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (2014).

452

16 U.S.C. §§ 1 – 18f-3 (2012) (National Parks), and 16 U.S.C. § 460K (2012) (Naitonal Wildlife Refuges).

453

See Bruce Babbitt, supra note 4 At 853-54 (noting the challenges of lack of management control and

competing management objectives).
454

PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 2015, supra note 126 at 199, 201.

455

Id. at 205.
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within National Forests are not broken out by ownership type, inholdings are found in USFS
managed Wilderness Areas in each of the eleven contiguous Western states.456 All told, inholdings in
National Forest System lands managed under a conservation designation total 416,615 acres across
this landscape.457 Statewide in Arizona, “over one million surface and subsurface acres of Trust land
are effectively removed from revenue-generating opportunities because they are included within the
boundaries of federal holdings.”458 Grants or sales to private entities further complicate this
landscape. In Montana, for instance, federal and private land surrounds approximately 1.2 million of
the state’s 5.1 million acres of state trust lands.459
In Utah, SITLA manages approximately 96,000 acres of surface estate and 97,000 acres of
minerals that are located within WSAs.460 An additional 20,220 acres are within National
Conservation Areas, which are managed, in part, “to conserve, protect, and enhance for the benefit
and enjoyment of present and future generations the ecological, scenic, wildlife, recreational,
cultural, historical, natural, educational, and scientific resources of the National Conservation
Area.”461 The recently created Bears Ears National Monument surrounds another 109,106 acres of

456

Compiled from, U.S. FOREST SERV., DEP’T. OF AGRIC., LAND AREAS OF THE NATIONAL FOREST

SYSTEM (2013). Also note that National Forest System lands contain approximately 6 million acres of
outstanding mineral claims. Andrew C. Mergen, Surface Tension: The Problem of Federal/Private Split Estate Lands,
33 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 419, 430 (1998).
457

Compiled from, U.S. FOREST SERV., DEP’T. OF AGRIC., LAND AREAS OF THE NATIONAL FOREST

SYSTEM (2013).
458

Id.

459

Karl Puckett, A New Approach: Program Aims to Open Islands of Landlocked State Land, GREAT FALLS

TRIBUNE March 4, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 6117724.
460

E-mail from Jessica Kirby, GIS Manager, Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, to

John Ruple, Research Associate, S.J. Quinney College of Law (March 6, 2013 5:40 PM) (on file with author).
461

16 U.S.C. § 460www(a) (2012) (Red Cliffs NCA); 16 U.S.C. § 460xxx(a) (2012) (Beaver Dam Wash NCA).

Acreage calculations are from PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 2015, supra note 126 at 201.
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state land.462 Surrounding lands that are supposed to generate revenue with lands that are managed
for conservation deprives trust beneficiaries of the revenue they were promised and drives
significant frustration. .
2.

Perceived Lack of Voice in Public Land Management

Perceived injuries help explain the animosity underpinning the transfer movement, and
Utah’s experience offers a telling example. Utah’s first white settlers were members of the Mormon
Church who fled persecution in New York, Ohio, Missouri, and then Illinois, hoping to be left alone
to follow their faith.463 They witnessed the murder of their founder and leader, Joseph Smith,464 were
pilloried for their religious beliefs,465 had federal troops called out against them,466 and saw the
federal government target their church for dissolution.467 These injuries and the distrust they
engender are still felt in the tightly knit and predominantly Mormon communities that dominates

462

Bureau of Land Mgmt., Dep’t of the Interior, Bears Ears National Monument Fact Sheet and Q&A (Dec.

28, 2016) https://www.blm.gov/programs/national-conservation-lands/national-monuments/utah/bearsears/fast-facts.
463

BICKMORE-WHITE, supra note 96 at 1-2.

464

Id.

465

Opposition to Utah’s attempts at statehood was often vitriolic and salacious, centering on the religious

practices of the territory’s Mormon residents. See e.g. Against Admission of Utah as a State, H.R. Misc. Doc.
No. 208, 42nd Cong., 2d. Sess. (May 6, 1872) (including testimony from thirty apostate Mormons alleging
that the Church “counseled murder and robbery,” are “enemies of the United States Government,” and
would not obey federal law or the Constitution.). See generally, BICKMORE-WHITE, supra note 96 at __.
466

BICKMORE-WHITE, supra note 96 at 4.

467

24 Stat. 635 (1887). In 1887, Congress passed the Edmunds-Tucker Act dissolving the Mormon Church

and directing the federal government to confiscate all church properties valued over $50,000. Application of
the Edmunds-Tucker Act was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. U.S., 136 U.S. 1 (1890). The direct effects of the Act were short lived because on
October 25, 1893, Congress authorized the release of seized assets because “said church has discontinued the
practice of polygamy and no longer encourages or gives countenance to any manner of practices in violation
of law, or contrary to good morals or public policy.” 28 Stat. 980 (1893).
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rural Utah and much of the Intermountain West.
These scars might have healed in time, but in the eyes of many, the injuries continued.
Between 1951 and 1962, eighty-six aboveground nuclear tests were conducted at the Nevada Test
Site,468 dispersing radioactive material across much of Utah and the West, and resulting in an
increased incidence of certain types of cancers.469 Nevada is still seen by many as the location of
choice for long-term storage of high-level nuclear waste.470 Similarly, chemical weapons were stored,
and later incinerated in Colorado, Utah, and in Oregon.471
Utah and Nevada were also the destination of choice in a failed proposal to construct an
intercontinental ballistic missile system shuttling more than 200 nuclear missiles between 4,600
shelters — “a colossal system extending over one-third of Utah and two-thirds of Nevada.”472 Most
of that landscape, which for generations had been home to ranching families, would have been made
off-limits because of national security concerns. Residents saw themselves as an afterthought to the
federal government. As Utah’s Governor Matheson explained, “The draft EIS devoted thirty-one
pages of discussion to the pronghorn antelope, seventeen pages to rare plants, . . . but only five and
one-half pages to the impacts on human beings.”473
Another perceived injury occurred in 1996 with designation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante
National Monument.474 At roughly 1.9 million acres, the Monument is the largest in the continental

468

Steven Simon, André Bouville & Charles Land, Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests and Cancer Risks, 94 AM.

SCIENTIST 48 (2006).
469

Id. See also, MATHESON, supra note 105 at 87-103.

470

For a history of efforts to develop Yucca Mountain, see J. SAMUEL WALKER, THE ROAD TO YUCCA

MOUNTAIN: THE DEVELOPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (2009).
471

MATHESON, supra note 105 at104-13.

472

Id. at 59, 55-86.

473

Id. at 82.

474

See Proclamation 6920 Establishment of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, 61 FED. REG.
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United States.475 Former County Commissioner Joe Judd tells of an eleventh-hour trip to
Washington D.C. to lobby against monument designation:
When we asked about the area being discussed for the Monument, they chose to tell
us that they had no monument plan. ‘Nothing was going to happen. We don’t know
anything about it.’ Then, when we told them where we thought it was going to be,
they said, ‘Do people really live there?’ And then I knew we were in trouble.476
Commissioner Judd’s description and the actions that proceeded it reinforce a perception of federal
ignorance of, and disregard for, the lives of rural Westerners that fuels the current discontent.477
Adding to these frustrations, many state leaders across the West contend that the federal
government’s failure to actively manage public lands contributes to the “vast expansion of

50223 (Sept. 18, 1996).
475

See www.blm.gov/ut/st/en/fo/grand_staircase-escalante.html.

476

Joe Judd, County Collaboration with the BLM on the Monument Plan and its Roads, 21 J. LAND, RES. & ENVTL. L.

553 (2001).
477

While the monument’s detractors correctly note that it was designated without contemporaneous state or

public input, establishment was not surprise and the federal government was well aware of state or local
interests. As early as the 1930s, President Roosevelt considered withdrawing part of the region to create a
national monument. James R. Rasband, Utah’s Grand Staircase: The Right Path to Wilderness Preservation?, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 483, 489 (1999). See also, Christopher Smith, Grand Staircase National Monument: It’s a New Name
But an Old Idea; Monument: New Status, Old Idea, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE Oct, 6, 1996, at A1 (“In January 1936,
the Park Service announced that as a result of the recommendations of the Utah Planning Board, the agency
was planning to seek congressional approval for the 6,968-square-mile ‘Escalante National Monument.’”).
Over the decades that followed, multiple proposals were all brought forward in an effort to protect federal
lands in Southeastern Utah. See generally, SAMUEL J. SCHMIEDING, NAT’L PARK SERV., FROM CONTROVERSY
TO COMPROMISE TO COOPERATION: THE ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF CANYONLANDS NATIONAL

PARK (2009). Development in Southern Utah was hotly debated for more than twenty years prior to the
designation, and state as well as local concerns were well known. John D. Leshy, Putting the Antiquities Act in
Perspective, in VISIONS OF THE GRAND STAIRCASE-ESCALANTE, EXAMINING UTAH’S NEWEST NATIONAL
MONUMENT 86-88 (Robert B. Keiter et al. eds.1998). Many of these concerns were addressed in the
Proclamation creating the Monument, which included express recognition of valid existing rights. See
Proclamation 6920, supra note 474.
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catastrophic wildfire, damaging insects, disease and invasive species.”478 Together, this results in a
wildfire season that is longer, more extreme, and which produces larger, more damaging fires.479
Others blame the federal government for allowing wild horses populations to grow unchecked,
consuming forage needed to support wildlife and cattle.480 Utah is also suing the federal government
over claims of title to road rights-of-way across federal public lands,481 alleging both a state
ownership interest and ongoing injury at the hands of the federal government. Set against this
backdrop of perceived mistreatment by federal officials, it is not surprising that many Westerners
would prefer to manage the public domain themselves.
3.

Economic Instability

The federal government controls the type and level of development that occurs on public
lands. In the eyes of some, this leaves local communities at the mercy of federal agencies for access
to the resources and resulting revenue upon which their future depends.482
The federal government has taken steps to offset these concerns through programs like
PILT that offset lost tax revenue.483 Congress also directs that revenue generated on the public
domain be shared with state and local governments that are experiencing the development,484

478

W. GOVERNORS ASS’N, Policy Resolution 2012-01, Wildfire Management and Resilient Landscapes (June 4, 2012).

479

Id.

480

See W. Rangeland Conservation Ass’n et al v. Jewell, Docket No. 2:14-cv-00327 (D. Utah Apr 30, 2014)

(suing to force the federal government to remove wild horses from the range).
481

Separate complaints were filed for each county. Copies of the complaints are available at

http://publiclands.utah.gov/rs-2477-roads/current-litigation/statewide-complaints/ (last visited May 28,
2014).
482

See generally, Robert L. Glicksman, Fear and Loathing on the Federal Lands, 45 U. KANSAS L. REV. 647 (1997),

and John D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics and Federal Lands, supra note 3 at 317, 343-50.
483

31 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(1) (2012). See also, section III.D., supra.

484

See e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 191 (2012) (sharing revenue derived from mineral development occurring on public

lands). See also, section III.D., supra.
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offsetting the cost of public services (like emergency medical services and road maintenance)
incurred because of federal activity.485
Revenue sharing payments can be substantial. From 2006 through 2015, federal land and
revenue sharing payments to the eleven contiguous Western States averaged over $3.0 billion
annually.486 Budgets in states like Wyoming, where significant mineral development occurs on public
lands, depend on commodity production from federal land. For the past nineteen-years, at least
ninety-nine percent of Wyoming’s federal land payments are attributable to mineral revenue sharing,
and over the past decade these payments averaged almost $1.3 billion annually.487
Revenue sharing programs are, however, highly susceptible to commodity price volatility and
to production volume changes. In Oregon, federal land payments declined from $537 million in
1989 to $112 million in 2000, bouncing back to $364 million the next year, and then declining
steadily back to $114.7 million in 2015.488 In Utah, for instance, federal land payments to the state
have been impacted by oil price instability. The state received around $70 million annually through
the late 1990s, with payments increasing steadily until 2006 when they hit $229 million and peaking
at $341 million in 2011.489 Year-to-year changes in payments, however, exceeded $45 million in eight
of the last ten years.490
Most federal land payments are directed back to rural the communities where the revenue
originates.491 Accordingly, when federal land payments cycle wildly those shifts have a
485

Thomas G. Alexander, Senator Reed Smoot and Western Land Policy, 1905-1920, 13 ARIZONA & THE WEST

245, 263 (1971) (discussing political compromises leading to enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920).
486

Headwaters Economics, supra note 226.

487

Id.

488

Id.

489

Id.

490

Id.

491

See e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 191(a) (2012) (directing states to give “priority to those subdivisions of the State
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disproportionate impact on rural counties. This fiscal uncertainty can create profound difficulties for
counties trying to plan for major investments like schools and infrastructure.
4.

Bellicose State Rhetoric

While frustrations may be understandable, strident state language can drive a wedge between
the state and federal governments, making cooperation more difficult. As a BLM spokesperson
recently explained to the Utah Legislature, “It is frustrating as we work to identify the best possible
path forward for everyone when some of the entities we are trying to work with consistently feel the
need to poke us in the eye and then complain we are not working with them.”492
Utah’s hard line positions have been codified into state law, leaving little room for
compromise. Under Utah law, BLM and USFS land management plans should not “designate,
establish, manage, or treat” public lands in ways that resemble Wilderness, “including the
nonimpairment standard applicable to WSAs or anything that parallels, duplicates, or resembles the
nonimpairment standard.”493 Rather, federal plans should “achieve and maintain at the highest
reasonably sustainable levels a continuing yield of energy, hard rock, and nuclear resources,”494
“achieve and maintain livestock grazing . . . at the highest reasonably sustainable levels,”495 and
except in very rare instances, the BLM should not designate Areas of Critical Environmental
Concern, “as the BLM lands are generally not compatible with the state’s plan and policy for
managing the subject lands.”496 Similar demands apply to including rivers in the National Wild and

socially and economically impacted by development of minerals leased under this chapter”).
492

Amy Joy O’Donoghue, Battle Between Utah’s Rural Counties and BLM Intensifies, DESERET NEWS, June 28,

2014, 2014 WLNR 17629725.
493

UTAH CODE ANN. § 63J-8-104(1)(b) (2014).

494

UTAH CODE ANN. § 63J-8-104(1)(d) (2014).

495

UTAH CODE ANN. § 63J-8-104(1)(e) (2014).

496

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63J-8-104(1)(l) and 63J-4-401(8)(c) (2014).
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Scenic River Systems,497 and to Wilderness Area designation.498
To advance its land management objectives, the Utah legislature establishes expansive
“energy zones” where the “highest management priority . . . is responsible management and
development of existing energy and mineral resources.499 Accordingly, the state supports “full
development of all existing energy and mineral resources”500 within these zones and calls upon the
federal government to “expedite the processing, granting, and streamlining of mineral development
and energy leases and applications to drill, extract, and otherwise develop all existing energy and
mineral resources” within them.501 The legislature has also created “Timber Agricultural Commodity
Zones” where the federal government is directed to “expedite the processing, granting, and
streamlining of logging and forest product harvesting,”502 and “Grazing Agricultural Commodity
Zones” where grazing permitting is to be expedited.503
Utah’s commodity-production-first direction conflicts with federal land managers’ multipleuse mandate and direction contained in land management plans. There is little room for compromise
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when state employees must demand the impossible. Untenable demands also mislead the public into
believing that the state can dictate federal management, and that full development is a viable goal.
When these demands are not met, those that expect results consistent with legislative edicts become
only more frustrated. The result is a self-fueling cycle that increases tension.
C.

Alternatives to Land Transfers

Improving public land management is a laudable goal, and addressing the root causes of
frustration is necessary to dampen the fires fueling the transfer movement. The ideas presented
below are not an exhaustive list, but rather, examples intended to drive further discussions.
1.

Comprehensive Review and Revision of Public Land Laws

The last systematic review of federal public land law, policy, and governance was conducted
by the Public Land Law Review Commission of 1965-1969.504 Since that commission released its
final report in 1970, the challenges and opportunities facing federal public lands have become more
numerous and complex. Our scientific understanding of science and ecological process has also
increased dramatically, and the difficulties inherent in striking a balance between competing interests
has grown with those changes. We have responded by modifying both law and policy, but these
revisions are poorly integrated. The result is a complex web of overlapping laws that are challenging
for even the most sophisticated of managers to navigate.
As we approach the fiftieth anniversary of the last federal public land law review, it is time to
ask what we want from our public lands, and what public land heritage we want to leave for our
children. The current political climate makes it difficult to envision Congress proposing the kind of
comprehensive bipartisan review we need, and those who benefit from the status quo, whether on
the left or the right of the political spectrum, will likely oppose any effort that threatens their
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position. The possibility of failure, however, should not prevent us from seeking improvement.
2.

Adequate Agency Funding

We cannot continue to bemoan resource conditions and permitting delays while
simultaneously depriving public land managers of the staff and resources required to do their jobs.
“Staffing levels for those dedicated to managing National Forest System lands has decreased by 39
percent — from approximately 18,000 in 1998 to fewer than 11,000 in 2015.”505 Land management
funding fell by thirty-three percent, impacting “critical projects involving energy pipelines,
geothermal, electric transmission, hydropower, telecommunication infrastructure, including cellular
towers and traditional line service and broadband facilities.”506 Land management planning funding
fell by sixty-four percent, significantly effecting the USFS’s “ability to engage with the public and
partners to address management issues and opportunities. . . . These efforts are essential for
garnering public support and reducing appeals and litigations, which impacts our ability to
implement key restoration efforts and increases implementation costs.”507
Charging market rates for commodities produced from public lands, and returning those
funds to the agencies that manage those lands, is a simple way to begin addressing the funding
shortfall. Under federal law, the United States charges a 12.5 percent royalty on oil and gas produced
from federal lands.508 In contrast, within the Intermountain West, states charge between 16.67
percent and 25 percent production royalties.509 Raising the federal oil and gas royalty rate to 16.67%
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would have produced over $800 million in additional revenue during 2012.510 Under federal law
roughly half of these funds would have been distributed to the states where the development
occurred — the remainder could have been used to fund the agencies managing our public lands.
Modernizing federal coal leasing regulations provides a similar opportunity. Current
regulatory subsidies, marketing loopholes, and royalty valuation policy deprived the federal
government of about $850 million between 2008 and 2012,511 and changing the point at which coal
value is measured would have generated an additional $5.6 billion in federal revenue.512 Roughly half
of this revenue would have gone to the states where the development occurred; the remainder could
have funded public land management.
Hard rock mining is also ripe for reform. Hard rock miners on federal land do not pay any
federal mineral royalty. The federal government is, however, free to impose a royalty on minerals
mined from federal lands, or to tax mined minerals.
Though some will argue that any royalty or tax increase will slow economic growth, the
prevalence of state taxes on natural resource commodity development belies the point. As of 2014,
at least thirty-four states imposed a severance tax on natural resources, and these taxes provided
states with $17.8 billion in revenue.513 All eleven contiguous Western states have severance taxes,
which generated over $2.9 billion to support state government programs.514 New Mexico’s severance
tax does not appear to have chilled energy development, as the state ranks sixth in the nation in oil
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production, seventh in natural gas production, and twelfth in coal production.515 Wyoming also
ranks eighth in oil production, fifth in natural gas production, and first in coal production despite
taxing development.516
3.

Collaboration

Federal land management agencies are required to coordinate their management activities
with state and local governments. If utilized to their full potential, these requirements could help
states and local residents address land management challenges.517 Under FLPMA, the BLM must
develop and periodically revise plans for public land management.518 Critically, the BLM must:
[T]o the extent consistent with the laws governing the administration of the public
lands, coordinate the land use inventory, planning, and management of activities of
or for such lands with the land use planning and management actions of . . . the
States and local governments within which the lands are located. . . . Land use plans
of the Secretary under this section shall be consistent with State and local plans to
the maximum extent [s]he finds consistent with Federal law and the purposes of this
Act.519
Similarly, regulations implementing the National Forest Management Act require the USFS
to “coordinate land management planning with the equivalent and related planning efforts of . . .
state and local governments.”520 In preparing or revising land and resource management plans, the
USFS must consider state and local government objectives and the “compatibility and interrelated
impacts of these plans and policies; Opportunities for the plan to address the impacts identified or
contribute to joint objectives; and Opportunities to resolve or reduce conflicts, within the context of
515
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developing the plan’s desired conditions or objectives.”521
FLPMA’s consistency requirement provides the eleven contiguous Western states with a seat
at the table for decisions involving management of over 174 million acres of BLM land. USFS
regulations grant these states and their local governments a substantial role in planning for the over
140 million National Forest System acres. But to be effective, local input and plans must contain
detailed and realistic descriptions of future land use objectives and specific steps to move towards
that desired future condition. While many Utah counties have undertaken some planning, many
county plans lack critical information or detail. This problem may be more acute in rural counties
that lack the staff and resources to complete a comprehensive planning process. State funding to
build planning capacity and to prepare high-quality plans could give local governments a more
effective voice in public land management, but funding alone is not a panacea.
NEPA also provides an opportunity for local governments to engage in public land
management decisions. NEPA requires a detailed statement on the environmental impacts of, and
alternatives to, every “major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.”522 State or local agencies may become a cooperating agency523 and assist in the NEPA
analysis.524 Cooperating agency status can give state and local governments significant leverage, as
the lead federal agency must “[u]se the environmental analysis and proposals of cooperating agencies
with jurisdiction by law or special expertise, to the maximum extent possible consistent with its
responsibility as lead agency.”525
As with FLPMA’s coordination requirement, a state or local government’s ability to
521
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influence the NEPA process depends heavily on the quality of the information brought to the table.
Opinions and suggestions are not enough, and strident demands are unlikely to foster collaboration.
States and local governments must invest the time and effort to prepare rigorous fact-based plans,
environmental analyses, and thoughtful proposals. Where state and local input is not developed
fully, plans stand little chance of influencing federal decisions. Indeed, strident or poor quality plans
may do more harm than good if they demand the undeliverable, are ignored by federal agencies, and
local governments do not understand why their plans are not incorporated into federal decisions.
4.

Rationalizing the Landscape

Western landscapes are highly fragmented. See Figure 3. Reducing fragmentation by
consolidating state trust lands reduces planning and management conflicts for federal land managers
and facilitates planning and management for revenue-generating uses of state trust lands. FLPMA
authorizes both the BLM and USFS to undertake fragmentation-reducing land exchanges by trading
developable federal lands for state trust lands that are better suited for conservation.526 The two key
requirements for a FLPMA land exchange involve determinations that the parcels to be exchanged
are of equal value, and that the exchange is in the public interest.527 Congress can bypass FLPMA,
specifically authorizing a land exchange and streamlining the approval process.
The Utah Recreational Land Exchange (URLE) is an example of a successful recent
exchange. The URLE authorized the BLM to trade 35,609 acres of federal land for 25,553 acres of
state lands.528 The exchange removed the threat of development from sensitive lands along the
Colorado River and near two National Parks while allowing the state to pursue revenue generation
in more appropriate locations.
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Although the fragmentation-reducing benefits of land exchanges are clear, high transaction
costs and the challenges posed by enacting project-specific legislation foil most exchange efforts.529
Reform could improve the process, and groups such as the Western Governors’ Association are
moving towards that end.530 But even absent reform, land exchanges provide a proven valuable tool
for addressing a profound and pervasive challenge.
5.

Transition Assistance

Western communities sprung up around the resources settlers needed to survive and flourish
— water, rich farmland, timber, and minerals. As the era of manifest destiny drew to a close and our
nation began the transition from public land disposal to multiple-use, sustained-yield management,
communities often saw access to the resources on our public lands decline. The transition from
commodity development has been painful for communities that struggled to anticipate and adapt to
changing societal priorities, and for communities that were unable to diversify their economies. It
behooves us to assist communities that developed on promises of ready natural resource access to
transition to a less commodity-dependent future. Past efforts to aid in this transition are often
ungainly, but they contain valuable lessons nonetheless. The timber crisis of the 1980s provides a
particularly acute example of both the risk and the opportunity presented.
During the 1980s the Pacific Northwest was immersed in a bitter controversy over logging
of old-growth forests, declining old-growth forest dependent species, and the role of federal forests
in regional and local economies. The northern spotted owl was protected under the ESA in 1990,531
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and lawsuits over federal timber harvests shut down the federal timber sale program on nine
national forests.532 Timber harvests from federal land fell by eighty percent between 1989 and
1994,533 and 14,000 forest products jobs were lost.534
In convening a conference to address these issues, President Clinton set forth five principles
to guide development of a management strategy supporting both old-growth related species and a
sustainable timber industry, including direction that “we must never forget the human and the
economic dimensions of these problems. Where sound management policies can preserve the health
of forest lands, sales should go forward. Where this requirement cannot be met, we need to do our
best to offer new economic opportunities for year-round, high-wage, high-skill jobs.”535
The Northwest Economic Adjustment Initiative (NWEAI) was an outgrowth of that effort
and sought to provide relief for distressed timber communities, fostering long-term and
environmentally responsible economic development consistent with and respectful of rural
community character, and improving cooperation between governments.536 The NWEA provided
economic development and impact mitigation funds for assisting workers and their families,
business and industry, communities and infrastructure, and support ecosystem services.537 From
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1994 through 1999, NWEAI funding totaled approximately $1.2 billion.538
Admittedly, “no program can make career transition simple or painless, and the diversity of
people and their approaches to changes in their lives must be accommodated. Positive outcomes
may take a long time and cannot be measured simply in terms of wages or job placement.”539 Efforts
like the NWEA are needed across the West to help resource-dependent communities transition to
more diverse, stable, and prosperous futures. But helping communities adapt to our changing world
and societal priorities needs to begin before harsh social dislocations occur. With early and effective
assistance, maybe we can help residents across the West retain the ties to the land, the stable
economies, and a future for their kids that celebrates multi-generational ties to the land. In the end,
after all, that appears to be what many rural Westerners want most. With PILT and revenue sharing
programs providing millions of dollars to states annually state do not need to wait for the federal
government to fund such programs. States can begin investing more heavily in transition assistance
today, and begin addressing a pressing cause of frustration.
VI.

Conclusion
Like the sagebrush rebels before them, today’s transfer advocates feel left behind by evolving

public land management priorities that depart from their vision of how the West should be
managed.
The TPLA and its progeny appeal to that pain and frustration, but offer only empty answers
to real questions, and in so doing, distract us from opportunities to address the root causes of
frustration over public land management. The law is clear, the federal government possesses plenary
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power over the public domain, including the power to retain the land in federal ownership, and to
do so indefinitely. The federal government is not obligated to dispose of additional public land —
beyond the almost 400 million acres of land surface it already gave up in the eleven contiguous
Western states — and statehood enabling acts do nothing to change this settled legal reality.
Even if transfer advocates overcome long legal odds and a disposal obligation is found to
exist, such an obligation would not necessitate giving the land away, let alone giving the land to the
states. Furthermore, that duty to dispose would almost certainly not extend to lands that are mineral
in character, leaving states without the revenue they would need to manage the lands they fought so
hard to obtain. States would be faced with significant fiscal and policy challenges, and the public
would see fewer and fewer opportunities to engage in land management decisions.
The fate of our Western public lands matters, as does the fate of those communities that
depend on our public lands. We must look beyond the empty promise of easy riches and begin the
hard work needed to address profound questions raised by evolutions in public land management
policies, including what we owe to those who live closest to the public domain. Their pain and
frustration are real, and that pain and frustration need to be addressed if the next generation is to
avoid revisiting these same battles. There are opportunities to improve public land management:
updating laws, consolidating lands, fully funding agencies and community development, and
cooperating with our neighbors all hold promise.
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